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SCOT" H. HUGHES*

Mediator Immunity: The Misguided
and Inequitable Shifting of Risk

C

onsider the case of the Negligent Neutral and the Disgruntled Dealer:'
After months of squabbling, two partners trying to split up
their rare and ancient art business reluctantly succumb to the
urging of their accountant and attempt to resolve their conflict
through mediation. In the early stages of the mediation, while
trying to get a handle on the value of the various components of
the business, the mediator states, "I am not a tax lawyer, but
doesn't this issue on taxes have some value that should be considered in your division of assets?"
"We hadn't thought of that," the partners chime in.
"Now, you should confirm this with your attorneys, but I think
it's worth considering," the mediator says.
Although the bargaining becomes quite contentious at times,
the partners persevere in their efforts. Late into the evening they
work. Patience is running thin and tempers are frayed. The parties and the mediator are obviously exhausted. Many issues have
been addressed, but the two continue to squabble over a prized
Grecian urn they have held as a hallmark of their business since
first opening the doors. The mediator, trying to break the
* Dickason Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. B.A.
Architecture, Arizona State University; J.D. Creighton University School of Law;
LL.M., Temple University School of Law. I wish to thank my research assistants
Rachel Bayless, Paul Bossert, Catherine Bryan, Stephanie Fuchs, Cydni Sanchez,
Annie Sovcik, Camille Wagner, and Rachel Winston for their creative insight and
excellent help. I also wish to acknowledge the University of New Mexico School of
Law for providing financial support for this project. Finally, I want to thank my
spouse, Peggy, for her limitless encouragement and patience while I finished this
project.
1 Adopted from Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go
the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 14 (2001). Used with permission of the Marquette Law Review.
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logjam, mentions the tax issue again, but fails to attach her previous admonition about seeking a separate opinion.
"All right, all right ...

if you give me the tax break, you can

have the urn." Tears rolling down his cheeks, the partner continues, "That urn is so special. I don't want to part with it, but I
can't keep it either. I can use the tax break to help care for my
mother." Near defeat, his voice trails off, "I think she has
Alzheimer's .... " After another two hours of drafting, an agreement is signed at 1:00 a.m.
Ominously, the mediator was wrong; the tax break is useless.
After the parties learn the truth, the Disgruntled Dealer sues to
void the agreement and recover his interest in the Grecian urn
under the theory of mutual mistake of the law. 2 As an alternative remedy, his attorney joins the mediator as a co-defendant
and alleges malpractice arising from the negligent tax opinion.
Unfortunately, plaintiff's counsel has overlooked a little-known
statute granting the mediator immunity for her acts.3 Counsel
for the mediator files the appropriate motion and quickly obtains
a dismissal.
Should the Negligent Neutral be afforded immunity, thus barring the Disgruntled Dealer from any remedy for the negligent
tax advice?
Consider next, the case of the Misbehaving Mediator and the
Pasty Participant:4
Late in the afternoon, after a long day of mediation over a
disputed oil lease, one of the parties begins to complain of chest
pains and cites a history of heart troubles. Upon asking that the
mediation be postponed to a later date, the mediator commands,
"Nobody's leaving this place until we have an agreement!"
Overwhelmed by the mediator's stridency, the party surrenders
to the mediator, and a settlement is reached shortly thereafter.
However, the stricken party has little memory of the final stages
2 See generally Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, 407 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir.
1969) (supporting the common law principle of mutual mistake of the law).
3 Both of these scenarios refer to statutes because the majority of states with immunity provisions have done so in this manner, although some case law exists and a
number of states have court rules that create mediator immunity. See infra Appendix and Parts II and III.
4 This hypothetical is adopted from Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV,
1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 1996) (finding an exception to the normal
rule of confidentiality where defendant alleged coercion in defense of action to enforce settlement agreement reached during mediation).
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of negotiation and even less of what she signed. When the other

party sues to enforce the agreement, counsel for the Pasty Participant impleads the mediator. Using a statute similar to the one
in the previous hypothetical, counsel for the mediator convinces
the court to dismiss the claim against the mediator. Should the

mediator be able to avoid answering for this egregious conduct?
Whether or not the Pasty Participant would ultimately prevail at
trial on her claim against the mediator, should she be foreclosed

from bringing her claim? If the legislatures and the courts extend
immunity to mediators, should it cover willful misconduct or just
negligence? What are the economic and social ramifications that

arise from providing mediators with immunity for their actions?
INTRODUCTION

The last twenty-five years have seen enormous growth in the
use of mediation as a practical, efficient, and gentle alternative to
traditional litigation for conflict resolution.5 Much of the increased use of mediation has been accomplished through the development of mediation programs by state and federal court
7
systems,6 referred to as "court-annexed" or "court-connected."
Court-annexed mediation has expanded the "win/win" culture of
integrative bargaining to include settlement of actions pending in
5 See Kent L. Brown, Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications, 1991 J.
Disp. RESOL. 307 (1991).
6 See Richard C. Reuben, PublicJustice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 594 (1997) ("One common route to
ADR is through legislatively or judicially mandated programs for certain types of
disputes. Many state legislatures have enacted statutes that require certain casesidentified primarily by subject matter and/or the amount in controversy-to be arbitrated or mediated before they may be tried in court."); EDWARD J. BERGMAN &
JOHN G. BICKERMAN, COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON

SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1998); Art Thompson, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Litigation in Kansas, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 351, 354 (2003).
7 A search for "court-annexed mediation" on the Web using the Google search
engine generated 3,480 hits with references for nearly every state, many federal
courts, and places as diverse as Argentina, Australia, Canada, England, Germany,
India, Japan, Korea, The Netherlands, Ukraine, and Zambia. Google Search:
"court-annexed mediation," at http://www.google.com (May 1, 2003). A follow-up
search on April 11, 2004 generated 5,830 hits with similar international diversity.
Interestingly, the second search produced a proposed piece of legislation in Trinidad
and Tobago that would provide for full immunity with an interesting twist.
Mediators would be completely immune except if they breach confidentiality.2 0See
03
/
Mediation Bill, 2003, available at http://www.ttparliament.org/bills/senate/
b2003s10.pdf.
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the courts.' In addition to the normal gains attributable to the
parties, such as the retention of self-determination, and the ability to craft creative settlements and possibly decrease costs, the
courts can now celebrate a reduced docket, as well as increased
levels of disputant satisfaction. 9

Accompanying this growth, a majority of states and the District of Columbia now have statutes, court rules (both state and
federal), or case law creating immunity for mediators to insulate
them from most, if not all, civil liability for wrongdoing during
the mediation, such as the cases of the Negligent Neutral and the
Misbehaving Mediator.'

°

If mediators can avoid litigation be-

cause of their conduct, the argument goes, an adequate supply of
mediators will be guaranteed. 1 Without protection from vexatious litigation, mediators will be reluctant to participate in courtannexed programs, thus denying the courts the necessary resources to settle claims. This is especially true when mediators
are expected to volunteer their services or are paid substantially

less than market rates.' 2

8 See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT (1994); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton, 2d ed. 1991);
ROGER FISHER & SCOTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

AS WE NEGOTIATE (1989); WILLIAM URY, GETING PAST No: NEGOTIATING WITH
DIFFICULT PEOPLE (1991); WILLIAM URY, THE THIRD SIDE: WHY WE FIGHT AND
How WE CAN STOP (2000).
9 STEVENS H. CLARKE ET AL., COURT ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS vii (1995); JOHN A. GOERDT,
SMALL CLAIMS AND TRAFFIC COURTS: CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, CASE

CHARACTERISTICS, AND OUTCOMES in 12 URBAN JURISDICTIONS Xii (1992); Keith

Schildt et al., Major Civil Case Mediation Pilot Program, 17th Judicial Circuit of
Illinois ii (1994) (unpublished preliminary report, on file with author); Linda Slack,
A Comparative Analysis on the Benefits of Mediation in the Cobb County Superior
Court 10 (May 1996) (unpublished preliminary report, on file with author).
10 For a complete listing of such provisions, see the Appendix; see also discussion
infra at Parts II and III.
11 Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901 (Ct. App. 1990); Note, The Sultans
of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American Mediators, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1876, 1893 (1986) [hereinafter Sultans of Swap]; but cf. Michael Moffitt, Suing
Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 149 (2003) (arguing that it is very difficult to sue
mediators successfully).
12 No empirical data exists to support this supposition. However, there is anecdotal evidence to the contrary. In seventeen years of administering the MetroCourt
Mediation Division, Director Susan Barnes Anderson has never encountered any
resistance from mediators about mediating in this small claims program without protection from civil liability. During this period the program has conducted approximately 15,000 mediations with a revolving panel of volunteer mediators that
frequently numbers more than one hundred. The mediators cover a diverse array of
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Unfortunately, the reasoning behind both the statutes and the
limited case law are unsound and the results are inequitable.

First, the two important cases that have found mediator immunity have misapplied the principles, policies, and reasoning from
the case law on judicial immunity.13 Second, while the parties
and the courts both gain from court-annexed mediation, mediator immunity removes the risk of harm by a poor or misbehaving
mediator from the courts' shoulders and places it firmly on a few
unlucky and unprepared disputants. Mediator immunity represents the inequitable shifting of risk of mediator misconduct from
the mediators and the courts to those mediation participants least
able to protect themselves from or shoulder the burden of such
negative behavior. Although there has been considerable schol-

arship, both pro and con, concerning the advisability of mediator
immunity," none has addressed the disparate economic impact
experience, including some of the most experienced and sophisticated practictioners
in New Mexico. Interview with Susan Barnes Anderson, Director, MetroCourt Mediation Division, in Albuquerque, N.M. (April 2, 2004).
13 Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 893; Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
14 Arguments in favor of immunity for mediators include: Brian Dorini, Institutionalizing ADR: Wagshal v. Foster and Mediator Immunity, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 185 (1996) (asserting that immunity is necessary to make ADR more productive for users and practitioners, but provides no explanation of this phenomena);
Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 85, 86-87
(1986) (arguing that mediator should not be liable for terms agreed to by the parties,
but that there should be mechanisms for relieving parties of responsibility without
liability on the mediator's part); but see Sultans of Swap, supra note 11, at 1893
(arguing against mediator liability due to the deterrent effect that potential liability
would have on participation in mediation programs).
For arguments in favor of a limited form of immunity for mediators, see Arthur A.
Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment for
Model Legislation, 2 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 47 (1986) (claiming that absolute
immunity would lead to a decline in accountability and professional standards by
mediators and that the cost to the profession would be too great); Caroline Turner
English, Mediator Immunity: Stretching the Doctrine of Absolute Quasi-JudicialImmunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 759 (1996) (believing that without some form of responsibility there would be no safeguards to review mediator's
conduct, but asserting that without some protection no one would volunteer, thus
destroying the use of ADR within the courts); Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of
MediatorImmunity: When Mediators Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 629 (1997) (using an economic argument, the author calls for qualified immunity because the cost of insurance may limit accessibility, particularly in
cases with smaller amounts at risk); Moffitt, supra note 11, at 200 (arguing that qualified immunity for egregious conduct strikes the proper balance between allowing
the mediator to exercise subjective discretion and the rights of parties to recover in
the most offensive cases).
Arguments against mediator immunity include: Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for FiduciaryDuties?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 731 (1984) (arguing that
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that such immunity regimes may have on participants in mediation or the question of who is best situated to shoulder such
risk.

15

Part I of this Article contains a brief history and analysis of
judicial and quasi-judicial immunity derived from the common
law tradition dating back to seventeenth-century England. Part
II contains an analysis of mediator immunity arising from the
case law, while Part III contains an analysis of statutes and rules
creating immunity. Finally, Part IV concludes with an analysis of
mediator immunity from a risk-shifting and risk-spreading perspective and finds that no viable economic argument exists to
support the proposition.
I

A

BRIEF HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF
16
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

A.

History

Mediator immunity has its roots buried deeply within the common law tradition of judicial immunity that has developed over
the last four centuries. Judicial immunity allows judges to make
the mediator has a fiduciary duty to the parties and, if that duty is violated, the
parties should have a cause of action against the mediator); Amanda K. Esquibel,
The Case of the Conflicted Mediator:An Argument for Liability and Against Immunity, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 131 (1999) (arguing that immunity would erode the standards
of conduct and that potential liability provides incentives for conscientious behavior); Linda R. Singer, Immunity Imperils the Public and Mediator Professionalism,
NAT'L L.J. C12 (Apr. 11, 1994); Kevin C. Gray, Wagshal v. Foster: Mediators, Case
Evaluators, and Other Neutrals-Should They Be Absolutely Immune?, 26 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1229, 1249-50 (1996) (arguing that mediator immunity only confuses the
roles of the judge and mediator, especially for unknowing litigants whom are forced
through a mandatory mediation system); J. Sue Richardson, Comment, Mediation:
The Florida Legislature Grants JudicialImmunity to Court-Appointed Mediators, 17
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623 (1990).
15 But cf. National Standards for Court Connected Mediation Programs 14.0, at
http://www.caadrs.org/studies/liabilit.htm:
Courts should not develop rules for mediators to whom they refer cases
that are designed to protect those mediators from liability. Legislatures
and courts should provide the same indemnity or insurance for those
mediators who volunteer their services or are employed by the court that
they provide for non-judicial court employees.
16 For more complete histories of judicial immunity, see, J. Randolph Block,
Stump v. Sparkman and the History of JudicialImmunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 881
(1980); Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.
L. REV. 201, 237 (1980); K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the
Twenty-First Century, 39 How. L.J. 95, 97, 104 (1995).
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rulings without being hindered or intimidated by possible subsequent litigation. Judicial immunity first appeared in 1608 in
Floyd v. Barker when the English Court of Star Chamber dismissed the claim of Floyd against Judge Barker and others for
17
conspiracy in the murder trial and execution of William Price.
Lord Coke wrote on the question of liability:
[Y]et the Judge ...sworn to do justice, cannot be charged for
conspiracy, for that which he did openly in Court as Judge or
Justice of Peace: and the law will not admit any proof against
this vehement and voilent [sic] presumption of,,18law, that a justice sworn to do justice will do injustice ....
This immunity was limited to "any thing done by him as
Judge." 19 While acting as a judge in his or her official capacity,
the immunity is "absolute," no matter how malicious and corrupt
the judge may be.2 ° Absolute judicial immunity shields a judge
2 1 but
from civil liability and from all related trial proceedings,
22 or criminal prosecution. 23
not injunctive relief
In his 1980 article, Block delineated four public policy reasons
17 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1608). When dealing with the "violent" presumption
that a judge will do justice, the immunity granted seems to run from the sovereignty
of the King.
And the reason and cause why a Judge, for any thing done by him as Judge,
by the authority which the King hath committed to him, and as sitting in
the seat of the King (concerning his justice) shall not be drawn in question
before any other Judge, for any surmise of corruption, except before the
King himself, is for this; the King himself is de jure to deliver justice to all
his subjects; and for this, that he himself cannot do it to all persons, he
delegates his power to his Judges, who have the custody and guard of the
King's oath.
Id.
Interestingly, the opinion does not use the word "immunity," although the general
use of the word to mean freedom from charges, burdens, or duties dates to the 16th
century. "Certayn pryuylegys and prerogatyf... as... he schold not be constraynyd
to go forth to warre ... wyth such other lyke immunytes and pryuylegys." 7 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting STARKEY, England II.
i.151 (1538)).
18 Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306.
19 Id.at 1307.
20 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1871) (citing Fray v. Blackburn, 3
B & S 576, 122 Eng. Rep. 217 (1863)). Bradley is discussed infra, text accompanying
notes 40-47; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("[Ilmmunity applies
even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly ....); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (finding that an allegation of malice will not
destroy immunity).
21 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
22 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536 (1984).
23 Id. at 522; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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in Lord Coke's opinion in Floyd v. Barker, three of which are
still relevant today.2 4 First, litigation must be brought to an end,
otherwise "controversies will be infinite; et infinitum in jure
reprobatur.' 'a Second, since "[jiudges of the realm have the administration of justice, under the King, to all his subjects, they
ought not to be drawn into question for any supposed corruption.",2 6 In other words, the independence of the judiciary must
be protected;2 7 otherwise, judges might surrender their good
judgment in the face of threats and intimidation. 28 Third, without immunity, such attacks "would tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice, '29 thus injuring the public confidence in the
courts.3 °

The first judicial immunity case in the United States dates from
1792 and involves events predating the ratification of the Constitution. 3' After a state court of admiralty ignored an appellate
decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals and distributed prize
proceeds according to its own, earlier decision,3 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that an action for money against
33
the offending judge could not be sustained.
The history of judicial immunity over the next century is somewhat hazy, with some academics asserting that the principle was
not widely accepted, 34 and others arguing that cases finding liability dealt mostly with justices of the peace in their administrative, as contrasted with their judicial, authority.3 5 However,
24

Block, supra note 16.
Block, supra note 16, at 886 (quoting Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306
(1608)).
26
Block, supra note 16, at 886 (quoting Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307).
27 Block, supra note 16, at 886-87; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347
(1871).
28 Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347.
29
Block, supra note 16, at 886 (quoting Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307).
30 Block, supra note 16, at 887.
31 Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 Dall. 160 (Pa. 1792).
32 Block, supra note 16, at 897 ("Congress had passed a law encouraging the states
to set up state courts of admiralty, but directing that appeals from the judgments of
these courts be taken in the Court of Appeals of the United States.").
33 Ross, 2 Dall at 166.
34 Feinman & Cohen, supra note 16, at 237; Jeffrey M. Shaman, JudicialImmunity
from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 2 (1990) (asserting that
the history of judicial immunity has been far from uniform and universal); Note,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326-27 (1969)
(showing decisions from state courts with a variety of approaches to judicial immunity, including some states that found judges liable if they acted maliciously).
35 Block, supra note 16, at 899-900; THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
25
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nearly two hundred years later in 1967, the Supreme Court saw
little controversy when it found "[flew doctrines ...more solidly

established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction. "36
Despite the Supreme Court's conviction in the latter part of
the twentieth century, it gave the principle an inauspicious
launch a hundred years earlier in the 1868 case of Randall v.
Brigham, when it decreed that judges were not liable for civil
lawsuits for their actions even beyond their jurisdiction, "unless
perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly."3 7 Three years later, in Bradley v. Fisher,8

Justice Field corrected his previous remarks and placed the Supreme Court firmly in line with English precedent.39 Field held
that judges "are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,
even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly."4
What are the American courts' views of the policy reasons supporting judicial immunity? "This provision of the law is not for
the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for
the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of consequences."'" In this sentence,
buried deeply in a footnote in Bradley v. Fisher, Justice Field
quoted an 1867 English case and delineated two major policy
reasons supporting judicial immunity. First, the judiciary must remain independent to insure continued public confidence in the
judicial system. "Liability to answer to every one who might feel
himself aggrieved by the action of the judge ...

would destroy

that independence without which no judiciary can be either re47879 n.2 (2d ed. 1888).
36 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (finding immunity from liability for
municipal justice arising from claims of imprisonment and deprivation of civil rights
for the arrest and conviction of black clergy during the Civil Rights Movement). For
a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's historical view of immunity, see Pillai,
supra note 16, at 97, 104.
37 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868) (emphasis added).
38 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
39 Block, supra note 16, at 901.
4
oBradley, 80 U.S. at 351.
41 Id. at 349 n.16 (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, (1868) (3 L.R. - Ex. 220)); see also
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (containing same quotation).
LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CoNTRAcr
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spectable or useful."'42 Second, a judge must "be free to act upon
his own convictions, without apprehension of personal conse43
quences to himself.
B.
1.

The Tests for JudicialImmunity

The Judicial Act Test

In order for immunity to attach to a judge's conduct, two tests
must be met.4 4 First, the conduct in question must constitute a
"judicial act."'45 Second, the judge must not act in the absence of
jurisdictional authority. 46 For purposes of this discussion, the
"judicial act" test is crucial. One of the first attempts in the
United States to address the question of what constitutes a judicial act took place in the 1880 Supreme Court case of Ex parte
Virginia, where the Court explored the distinction between judicial and administrative acts.47 The Court found that the compiling of voter lists by a county court judge during Reconstruction
48
in Virginia constituted a ministerial act and not a judicial act.
In so doing, the Court avoided a conflict between the principle of
judicial immunity and equal protection rights under the 1874
42

Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347.

43 Id.; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (finding that a judge "should not have to fear that

unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.
Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless
decisionmaking but to intimidation.").
44 The case law concerning the relationship between these two questions is not
well formed. The Supreme Court in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), uses
both tests, but does so with little clarity and organization; see generally Block, supra
note 16, at 914; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) ("As a class, judges have
long enjoyed a comparatively sweeping form of immunity, though one not perfectly
well-defined.").
45 Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1608) (finding a judge immune "for
any thing done by him as Judge"); Lining v. Bentham, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 1 (1796)
(finding immunity from claims of unlawful imprisonment for contempt because the
"justice of the peace is not answerable in an action for what he does by virtue of his
judicial power"); Forrester,484 U.S. at 227 ("Difficulties have arisen primarily in
attempting to draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges.").
46 The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612) (finding that a judge
who held a surety bond was not immune from liability because the court lacked
jurisdiction over the underlying action); Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352; Stump, 435 U.S. at
349, 356-57.
47 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
48 The distinction between administrative and ministerial acts has generally been
abandoned in favor of distinguishing between judicial acts and administrative functions. See generally Block, supra note 16, at 887-92.
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Civil Rights Act:4 9
Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the
agent.... The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been
committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a
judge. It often is given to county commissioners, or supervisors, or assessors. In former times, the selection was made by
the sheriff. In such cases, it surely is not a judicial act, in any
such sense as is contended for here. It is merely a ministerial
act, as much so as the act of a sheriff holding an execution, in
determining upon what piece of property he will make a levy,
or the act of a roadmaster in selecting laborers to work upon
the roads. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no
difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, [etc.] Is their
election or their appointment a judicial act? 50
Nearly one hundred years later, Justice White, in the 1978 case
of Stump v. Sparkman, ignored the judicial-administrative distinction established in Ex parte Virginia and created a new test
for judicial acts:
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining
whether an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally peri.e.,
formed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, 51
whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
Sidestepping the administrative act question is understandable.
Despite the circularity of this standard, the Court was faced
with allegations surrounding the signing of a petition,53 clearly
distinguishable from an arguably administrative act such as the
creation of voter lists faced by the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Virginia.54

Ten years later the tables would turn back to examine the judicial-administrative distinction. In the 1988 case of Forrester v.
White, the Supreme Court refused to extend absolute judicial immunity to a judge's conduct in firing a court employee. Faced
49 Ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1874) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000)).
50 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
51 435 U.S. at 362.
52 But cf Block, supra note 16, at 914 ("[T]he Court had not previously 'had
occasion to consider, for purposes of the judicial immunity doctrine, the necessary
attributes of a judicial act .... ') (quoting Justice White from Stump, 435 U.S. at
360, although such a comment by Justice White is appropriate in context of the question presented).
53 Stump, 435 U.S. at 349.
54 100 U.S. at 348.
55 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
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with a claim of sex discrimination arising from the demotion and
firing of a probation officer, the Court had to undertake the difficult task of drawing "the line between truly judicial acts, for
which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to
have been done by judges."5 6 The Court determined that the decisions to demote and fire, if proven, were administrative in nature and not judicial.

57

The results of the judicial act inquiries provided by the Supreme Court have not been without controversy. 5 8 In Stump, the
Supreme Court was not faced with a question of whether the
Court was exercising an administrative function, but whether the
circumstances comprised a judicial act. The case involved a circuit judge who approved an ex parte petition by a mother requesting authority to have her "somewhat retarded" minor
daughter sterilized. 59 The court approved the petition without a
hearing, without notice to the child, and without appointment of
a guardian ad litem. The fifteen-year-old girl was told that she
needed an appendectomy and the surgery was performed. Two
years later, after discovering her condition, Sparkman brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of her constitutional
rights.6" Despite the tragic circumstances, the Court found that
the judge's conduct constituted a judicial act:
Because Judge Stump performed the type of act normally performed only by judges and because he did so in his capacity as
a Circuit Court Judge, we find no merit to respondents' argument that the informality with which he proceeded rendered
his action nonjudicial and deprived him of his absolute
immunity.6 1

In his dissent, Justice Stewart stated, "I think that what Judge
Stump did on July 9, 1971, was beyond the pale of anything that
could sensibly be called a judicial act."6 2 In support, he focused
on the fact that judges are not normally asked "to approve a
mother's wish to have her daughter sterilized,"6 3 nor otherwise
seek court approval for care of a sick child.64 Even if the mother
56
57
58
59

Id. at 227.
Id. at 229.
Pillai, supra note 16, at 98.
435 U.S. 349, 349 (1978).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 362-63.

62 Id. at 365 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 366.
64

Id.
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was wrong about her belief in the judge's authority, those "false
illusions" cannot convert the judges' response into a "judicial
act."6 5 Justice Stewart then equated Judge Stump's act to a petition by the mother to lock her daughter in the attic.6 6 In conclusion, he stressed that no case of judicial action existed. Also,
there was no notice, no right of appeal, nor "even the pretext of
principled decision-making."67
The "it's normal," "no, it's not normal" tit for tat that characterizes the reasoning of both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in Stump is of little help in distilling any rule or principle from the case to determine what behavior constitutes a judicial act. Nothing from either position would translate well to
other fact patterns. On the other hand, application of the metaphor of scale (as in the scale on a map) may aid in the analysis of
the facts. If you look at each opinion using the appropriate scale,
it is possible to see the division between the two opinions. In the
majority opinion, Justice White stood very far from the facts and
used the largest scale to examine Judge Stump's conduct. From
this distance, Justice White could only see that Judge Stump was
presented with a petition regarding a minor and at the time was
"'acting as a county circuit court judge.'"68 With this distant vantage point, the court was forced to rely upon the simplest representation-the mother approached the judge qua judge with a
petition regarding a minor.6 9 No other facts were necessary or
70
were sloughed off as unimportant:
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent suggests that Judge Stump's approval of Mrs. McFarlin's petition was not a judicial act be65
66
67

Id. at 367.
Id.

Id. at 369. Justice Powell joined in the dissent of Justice Stewart and emphasized that the judge's conduct did not constitute a "judicial act" because there was
no "possibility for the vindication of respondents' rights elsewhere in the judicial
system." Id.
68 Id. at 362. "State judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are called
upon in their official capacity to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors,
as for example, a petition to settle a minor's claim." Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.

Nor does it dispute that judges normally entertain petitions with respect to
the affairs of minors. Even if it is assumed that in a lifetime of judging, a
judge has acted on only one petition of a particular kind, this would not
indicate that his function in entertaining and acting on it is not the kind of
function that a judge normally performs.
Id. at 362 n.1l.
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cause of the absence of what it considers the "normal
attributes of a judicial proceeding." These attributes are said
to include a "case," with litigants and the opportunity to appeal, in which there is "principled decisionmaking." But
under Indiana law, Judge Stump had jurisdiction to act as he
did; the proceeding instituted by the petition placed before
him was sufficiently a "case" under Indiana law to warrant the
exercise of his jurisdiction, whether or not he then proceeded
to act erroneously. That there were not two contending litigants did not make Judge Stump's act any less judicial. Courts
and judges often act ex parte.
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, stood much closer to the
facts where it was possible to see greater detail. Instead of just
viewing the act as one involving the approval of a petition about
a minor, the dissent questioned whether the majority meant that
"a judge 'normally' is asked to approve a mother's decision to
have her child given surgical treatment generally, or that a judge
'normally' is asked to approve a mother's wish to have her
daughter sterilized."7 2 Either way, a parent does not normally
need approval from a judge,7 3 therefore, what the judge did "was
in no way an act 'normally performed by a judge."' 7 4
When examining a map of the United States, Washington,
D.C. will be only a small star or, at most, a truncated diamond
sandwiched between Maryland and Virginia. From that distance,
streets, boulevards, freeways, monuments, museums, and public
buildings are beyond our view. By choosing a similar, large scale
map, Justice White could only see a judge signing a petition,
something judges commonly do. All other detail was obscured
from his view. He could not see or question the circumstances
surrounding the petition that Justice Stewart observed, including
the bizarre nature of the petition and the request being made by
Sparkman's mother.
The scale metaphor can be used to analyze the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Mireles v. Waco." In that case,
Waco alleged that California Superior Court Judge Mireles, in an
impatient fit, ordered two police officers "'to forcibly and with
excessive force seize and bring"' the public defender into court
71
72
73

Id. at 363 n.12.
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 366.

74 Id. at 367.
75 502 U.S. 9 (1991).
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when he failed to appear. 76 In summarily reversing the Ninth
Circuit," the Court relied upon the test from Stump in finding
that the judge's act was a "function normally performed by a
judge."' 78 "A judge's direction to court officers to bring a person
who is in the courthouse before him is a function normally performed by a judge ....Waco, who was called into the courtroom

for purposes of a pending case, was dealing with Judge Mireles in
the judge's judicial capacity. '79 Again, this analysis of the facts
represented the broadest scale possible. Do judges order people
to appear before them? If so, this is a judicial act for which the
judge is immune.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, examined the conduct of Judge
Mireles from a closer vantage point and divided the judge's order
into two commands: an order to bring the respondent and an order to "commit a battery."'8 The first order was a judicial act;
the second was not. Justice Stevens' review of the facts took
place on a smaller scale, which allowed him to more accurately
dissect the offending conduct and arrive at the opinion that judicial immunity should not be stretched to cover Judge Mireles'
conduct.81
Absence of Jurisdiction Test

2.

In order for the plaintiff to recover under the second test for
judicial immunity, the offending conduct by the judge must have
done in a clear absence of jurisdiction, not just in excess of
been
it.8 2 For instance, if a probate judge with authority over wills and
estates started trying people for public offenses, there clearly
would be no jurisdiction.83 On the other hand, if a judge in a
criminal court attempted to try a defendant for something that
was not a crime, the judge's conduct would be in excess of his or
76

Id. at 10.
Waco v. Baltad, 934 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1991).
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
79 Id. The court continued by finding that Judge Mireles' actions may have been
excessive, but that excessiveness will not defeat immunity. Id. at 12-13.
80 Id. at 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 One commentator has asserted that the Mireles court abandoned the minimal
test of a "'function normally performed by a judge"' from Stump and that all that is
required now is "some nexus between the challenged act and the 'general function'
of the judge." Pillai, supra note 16, at 116.
82 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871).
77
78

83

Id. at 352.
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her jurisdiction, not completely without jurisdiction.8 4 "Where
there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of
such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the
judge, no excuse is permissible."8 5 The "clear absence of all jurisdiction" must be known to the judge.86
This test can be as opaque as the judicial act test. What represents an excess of jurisdiction or an absence of jurisdiction is by
no means clear. Certainly, Judge Mireles has the authority to order his bailiffs to hunt for and retrieve an attorney thought to be
elsewhere in the courthouse. If the judge directs them to use
whatever force is necessary, does this represent an excess of jurisdiction or an absence thereof? The answer is unclear and the test
itself provides little guidance.
C. Judicial Immunity Extended to Others
The stream of immunity began to run wider and deeper in the
late 1970s when the Supreme Court, in Butz v. Economou,87 extended quasi-judicial immunity to members of the executive
branch of government who exercise quasi-judicial functions, including administrative law judges and hearing officers in administrative agencies. And, in Imbler v. Pachtman,88 the court
confirmed an old common law principle and extended immunity
to state prosecutors from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they
function in a prosecutorial manner because they are "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."89
84 Id. As the Court noted,

Mr. Justice Blanc said there was "a material distinction between a case
where a party comes to an erroneous conclusion in a matter over which he
has jurisdiction and a case where he acts wholly without jurisdiction;" and
held that where the subject-matter was within the jurisdiction of the judge,
and the conclusion was erroneous, although the party should by reason of
the error be entitled to have the conclusion set aside, and to be restored to
his former rights, yet he was not entitled to claim compensation in damages
for the injury done by such erroneous conclusion, as if the court had proceeded without any jurisdiction.
,Id. at 353 (quoting Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 (1840)).
85
Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351-52.
86
Id. at 351.
87 438 U.S. 478 (1978); see discussion infra accompanying notes 110-133; see also
Taylor v. Mitzel, 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1978). For a short discussion of immunity cases after Bradley, see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1988).
88 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (affirming the holding of immunity for federal prosecutors
in Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam)).
89
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, see also Miller v. Reddin, 293 F. Supp. 216 (C.D. Cal.
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Some of the circuits have extended this reasoning to include state
parole officials.9"
Based upon a combination of the reasoning from Butz and Im-

bler, a line of cases involving public actors has created quasi-judicial immunity when the discretionary act or decision involves
"the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results."9 1 Immunity has been ex92 a
tended to such diverse actors as probation officers,

superintendent of a juvenile facility over the temporary release
of an inmate,9 3 and deputy counsel of a state bar disciplinary
board.9 4 However, the courts have declined to extend immunity
to other public actors, including members of boards or commit-

tees who, although they make decisions after hearing evidence
and deliberating, function normally in other roles and do not appear to be independent hearing officers or administrative law

judges. This includes school board members participating in a
student disciplinary process,95 members of a prison disciplinary

committee,96 and faculty members diverted from their regular
duties to determine if a professor should be dismissed from the
1968); Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 601-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935). But cf. Cooney v.
White, 845 P.2d 353, 364-65 (Wyo. 1992) (refusing to extend immunity to prosecutor
for advice to probation officer on how to proceed with petition to revoke probation
because it involved an executive function and not one tied irretrievably to the
prosecutorial function). See generally Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225-26 ("The common
law's rationale for these decisions-freeing the judicial process of harassment or
intimidation-has been thought to require absolute immunity even for advocates
and witnesses.").
90 See, e.g., Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830-831 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States ex rel. Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982); Sellars v. Procunier, 641
F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981).
91 Tango v. Tulevech, 459 N.E.2d 182, 186 (N.Y. 1983).
92

Id.

93 Santangelo v. New York, 474 N.Y.S.2d 995 (App. Div. 1984).
94

Forman v. Ours, 804 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. La. 1992); see also Sparks v. Character
and Fitness Comm. of Ky., 859 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting immunity to members of a state supreme court committee dealing with admission to practice law);
Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (granting immunity to members of an attorney disciplinary committee); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th
Cir. 1966) (granting immunity to a state bar association conducting disciplinary
proceedings).
95 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (granting, instead, quasi-immunity for
acts where the illegality under the Constitution or statutes was not clearly spelled
out).
96 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (finding no absolute immunity for
member of prison disciplinary committee); see also Mary and Crystal v. Ramsden,
635 F.2d 590, 600 (1980) (finding no absolute immunity for chair of disciplinary committee in juvenile facility).
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university as well as the members of the Board of Regents who
eventually decided to dismiss the professor. 97
Other courts have extended immunity to court personnel and
others closely related to judicial functions, such as law clerks,98
court clerks, 99 bailiffs,1" 0 jurors, 10 1 grand jurors,10 2 witnesses, 0 3
court commissioners,10 4 and referees. 10 5 Also, immunity has
been extended to court-appointed individuals such as physicians

appointed to determine the mental condition of an inmate nearing release (who later assaulted the plaintiff), 0 6 a trust officer
appointed as a conservator,1 0 7 a child protective services worker
taking a child into custody in accordance with a court order,'0 8

guardians ad litem, psychologists, and attorneys for children involved in child abuse actions. 0 9 However, immunity generally

was not extended to court personnel for actions alleging a viola97

Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, Civ. A. No. 95-2199-GTV, 1996 WL 705777,
at *11 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 1996).
98 Oliva v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 839 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1988).
99 Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983) (extending immunity for
discretionary acts normally reserved to the judiciary); Wiggins v. N.M. State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1981); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010,
1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting absolute immunity when court clerks act pursuant to a
court order or at a judge's discretion); Slotnick v. Stavinskey, 560 F.2d 31 (1st Cir.
1977) (finding absolute immunity for state court judges and their clerks from damage suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir.
1973) (applying immunity for court clerks for acts done in performance of their discretionary or quasi-judicial duties).
100 Adkins v. Clark County, 717 P.2d 275, 276-77 (Wash. 1986) (finding immunity
for bailiff who, contrary to instructions, gave the jury a law dictionary resulting in a
mistrial since the bailiff, in performing her duties, was the "judge's alter ego").
101 White v. Hegerhorst, 418 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1969).
102 Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 69 (1880).
103 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983).
104 Tagliavia v. County of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. Rptr. 467, 471 (Ct. App. 1980);
Linder v. Foster, 295 N.W. 299 (Minn. 1940).
105 Park Plaza, Ltd. v. Pietz, 239 Cal. Rptr. 51, 55-56 (Ct. App. 1987).
106 Brown v. Rosenbloom, 524 P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), affd, 532 P.2d 948
(Colo. 1975) (limiting immunity to good faith conduct by defendant physicians) see
also Linder, 295 N.W. at 301 (Minn. 1940) (finding immunity for two physicians who
were appointed by the court to examine plaintiff to determine her mental
condition).
107 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 1978); see also New Alaska
Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting immunity
to a receiver appointed to manage marital property during a dissolution).
108 Coverdell v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-765 (9th Cir.
1987).
109 Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1465-68 (8th Cir. 1987). See generally Howard
v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 899-900 (Ct. App. 1990).
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tion of their statutory duties." 0

To determine if quasi-judicial immunity applies, the court must
determine how closely the decision of the public actor compares

to that of judicial decision-making. Unfortunately, the dividing
line is unclear and the cases are not consistent. For purposes of
this analysis, we must focus on the conduct of the public actor. In
each case, he or she made a decision that impacted people's lives

directly or carried out the decisions of judges. This is true
whether or not absolute immunity is afforded to the public actor.
Whether it is a probation officer who is afforded immunity or
members of the Board of Regents who are not, the courts' analysis has focused on the nature of the decision and the surrounding
environment. Each has made a decision that determines the
alignment of the rights between the parties, conduct that is to-

tally opposite that of a mediator.
It is in this milieu that the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia,"' the California Court of Appeals,"' and numerous
courts and legislatures around the nation have extended immunity to mediators. 1' 3 First, I will discuss the case law and then
follow with an analysis of the legislation.
II

A

CASE LAW ANALYSIS OF MEDIATOR IMMUNITY

Although the first decision extending immunity to mediators

was issued in 1985,"1 the first major case dates from 1990. In
Howard v. Drapkin, the Court of Appeals for the Second District

of California extended judicial immunity to psychologists,
110 McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578, 585-86 (W.D. Va. 1973) (refusing to dismiss
clerk who allegedly violated state law).
111 Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
112 Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 893; see also Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1249.
113 See infra Appendix and discussion in Part III.
114 Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting appellants' argument
that the mediators acted in a clear absence of all jurisdiction). Although this case
deals with "mediators," it arises under Michigan law where the role of mediators
looks much more like that of arbitrators. The mediators issue an evaluation of the
case that at least one of the parties must reject in order to avoid it becoming the
basis of a judgment. Rule 403.7(c) and 403.15(a), Wayne County Cir. Ct. Further, if
a party rejects the evaluation, he or she must do 10% better in order to avoid the
imposition of actual costs. Rule 403.15, Wayne County Cir. Ct. This form of mediation is referred to as "Michigan Mediation" and is extremely distant from any acceptable definition of mediation. See CHRISTOPHER W.

MOORE,

PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 15

THE MEDIATION
(2d ed. 1996).
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mediators, and other neutrals. 11 5 The D.C. Circuit produced the
second major case in 1994 when it granted quasi-judicial immunity to a court-appointed mediator in Wagshal v. Foster after an
analysis of the test from Butz 116 We shall visit both cases at
length.
A.

Howard v. Drapkin

In Howard v. Drapkin, after a bitter custody battle, a disgruntled mother sued the parties' psychologist, alleging professional
negligence, among other claims, arising from an evaluation conducted for the parties during the underlying action." 7 Although
the parties originally hired the psychologist privately, they stipulated to a court order confirming that the expert would "render
non-binding findings and recommendations" in addition to his
evaluation. 11 8 In decreeing "that absolute quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to neutral third persons who are engaged in mediation, conciliation, evaluation or similar dispute
resolution efforts,""' 9 the California Court of Appeals paid only
momentary homage to the normal function test for judicial actions from Stump v. Sparkman,l2° jumped through a few intermediate hoops, 12 1 and then concluded that because of the
litigation crisis, such neutrals are very important and are badly
122
needed by the courts.
115 271 Cal. Rptr. at 893. This case was recently followed by the Fourth District of
the California Court of Appeals, which found immunity for a mediator following the
issuance of a report to the family court judge. See Goad v. Ervin, 2003 WL
22753608 (Ct. App. 2003).
116 Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1249 (applying Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1979)).
One other case dealing with mediator immunity comes from the bankruptcy court
for the Middle District of Florida: Matter of Sargeant Farms, Inc., 224 B.R. 842, 848
(1998). The court granted immunity to a court-appointed mediator but did so without analysis other than a momentary reference to Wagshal and without an actual
controversy concerning immunity being presented. Although there appears to be a
case, there does not appear to have been any controversy on this subject. This is not
surprising considering that Florida has a long tradition of mediator immunity. See
infra FLA. STAT. AN. § 44.107 (West 1998) and Appendix. This case merits little
further attention due to the dearth of analysis of the issues.
117 271 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
118 Id.

119 Id. at 896.
120 Id. at 896 n.3, 900 ("Immunity exists for 'judicial' actions; those relating to a
function normally performed by a judge and where the parties understood they were
dealing with the judge in his official capacity.") (interpreting Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
121 Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 896-900.
122 Id. at 901 ("We are persuaded that the approach of the federal courts is consis-
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In arguing for extensions of immunity to the category of persons who function apart from the courts in an attempt to resolve disputes, defendant and amicus emphasize that in this
day of excessively crowded courts and long delays in bringing
civil cases to trial, more reliance is being placed by both parties and the courts on alternative methods of dispute
resolution.123
The court then concluded by equating mediators, conciliators,
and evaluators with judges because they are impartial and neutral and,
hence, there should be entitlement to the same immunity
given others who function as neutrals in an attempt to resolve
disputes. In a sense, those persons are similar to a judge who
is handling a voluntary or mandatory settlement conference,
no matter whether they are (1) making binding decisions...
(2) making recommendations to the court... , or (3) privately
24
attempting to settle disputes, such as the defendant here.'
Now, let us return to a detailed review of the court's analysis.
After invoking the roots of English common law, 12 5 the court
test
first recited the traditional two-part judicial act/jurisdiction
1 26
immunity:
quasi-judicial
or
judicial
for establishing
It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the
exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial
determinations, including those rendered in excess of the
judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be ....

unless
The judge is immune127

"he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.'

The court then referenced the normal function test for judicial
acts from Forresterv. White, but did so only in a footnote: "Immunity exists for 'judicial' actions; those relating to a function
normally performed by a judge and where the parties understood
they were dealing with the judge in his official capacity."' 2 8 The
court made no analysis of the facts of the case in terms of either
the judicial act or the jurisdiction tests. It said nothing about
tent with the relevant policy considerations of attracting to an overburdened judicial
system the independent and impartial services and expertise upon which that system
necessarily depends.").
123
124
125

Id.
Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 896.

For a discussion of these two tests, see supra Part I.B.
271 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97 (citations omitted).
Id. at 896 n.3 (quoting Olney v. Sacramento County Bar Ass'n, 260 Cal. Rptr.
842, 844 (Ct. App. 1989)).
126
127
128
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what the psychologist and other neutrals actually did that
,equated to a judicial act,'1 29 nor was there any discussion of juris-

diction (either the excess or the absence). The failure to address
these principles fatally cripples the opinion when related to neu-

trals such as mediators.
Furthermore, justifying immunity on the basis that the courts
really need these neutrals is a blatant example of self-interest.
The court proceeds, without interruption, to the two principle

policy reasons supporting judicial immunity: First, the need for
finality of judgments and, second, to free judges from the fear of
vexatious litigation and, thereby, insure fearless and independent
judicial acts.1 3 ° With nothing more than a recitation of all the

actors upon whom the courts have bestowed immunity,"' the
court jumped amazingly to the conclusion that the right to immunity extends to actors connected to the judicial process, 32 or
those who serve "functions integral to the judicial process.', 1 33
This position was bolstered by the need to attract "to an

overburdened judicial system the independent and impartial services and expertise upon which that system necessarily de-

pends.' 1

34

Using the court's reasoning, it matters little what the

actor does so long as the actor is needed to help the court deal
with an overburdened docket.
Although the public policy recitations are representative, they

do not support immunity alone. Public policy arguments, while
supportive of immunity, do not constitute the tests to determine
if immunity should attach. First, the court must determine that
129 The court discusses the judicial act test briefly in terms of the duty performed
as contrasted with the status of the actor, but this adds little to the overall determination of whether or not the actor actually committed a judicial act.
So also, in determining whether a person is acting in a quasi-judicial fashion, the courts look at "the nature of the duty performed [to determine]
whether it is a judicial act-not the name or classification of the officer
who performs it, and many who are properly classified as executive officers
are invested with limited judicial powers."
Id. at 898 (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935)).
130 Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 898 ("However, a reading of the court's opinion shows that the court was
more interested in the 'connected with the judicial process' portion ... than with the
fact that the defendant could be classified as an 'official."') (quoting White v. Towers, 235 P.2d 209, 211 (Cal. 1951)).
133 271 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
134 Id. at 901.
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the individual performed a judicial act; 1 35 second, that the actor
did not act in a total absence of jurisdiction.' 36 So, what is a "judicial act"? A pertinent definition of the word "judicial" comes
from the Oxford English Dictionary: "Giving judgement or decision upon any matter.' 1 37 This is reinforced by the language
quoted by the Howard court from the Supreme Court's opinion
in Forresterv. White: "If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for
judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such
suits. ' 138 This language does not appear in the Court of Appeals'
analysis of the judicial act test, nor anything like it, because no
analysis occurred. It only appeared in the heart of the court's
1 39
discussion of the policy reasons supporting judicial immunity.
Unfortunately, although it quoted Forrester v. White, the court
did not completely state the policy justification; instead, it only
referred to the benefit to the public "when its judicial officers are
free from fear of personal consequences for acts performed in
their judicial capacity."' 4 ° This is correct so far but not complete.
The key to "acts performed in their judicial capacity," which the
court sought to keep independent and impartial, is whether the
act is one of "rendering decisions" as stated by the Supreme
Court in Forrester v. White.' 4 ' Courts make decisions that imdo not.
pose their will upon the parties to actions, and mediators
1 42
This is a subject we shall soon discuss in more detail.
Judge Klein recognized this problem when she concurred in
the result but "emphatically" dissented from the majority's reasoning. '43 The judge stated that immunity
even for judges, is limited to those judicial acts which are adjudicatory in nature, i.e., decisionmaking, dispositive, and the
immunity does not otherwise extend to acts which simply hap135 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-48 (1871); Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978); see also discussion supra accompanying notes 58-96.
136 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; see also supra discussion accompanying notes 97-102.
137 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 297 (2d ed. 1989).

138 271 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (emphasis added) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 226-27 (1988)).
139 271 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
140 Id.
141 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988) (quoted with approval in Howard,271 Cal. Rptr.
at 897).
142 See infra text accompanying notes 192-96.
143 Howard, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 906.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83, 2004]

pen to be done by judges. It is the function of adjudication of
an issue, the decisionmaking function, which requires and is
the basis for judicial immunity .... Forresterv. White is con-

trolling on that point; and it provides no basis for extending
such immunity to144
the non adjudicatory actions of judges, nor
of their adjuncts.

A few paragraphs later, she reiterated that immunity is granted
for functions that are "adjudicatory, decision-making, in nature. ' 145 Mediators do make decisions, but the decisions that
they make aid the parties in exercising their self-determination.
Neutrals do not adjudicate or decide the outcome of the parties'
conflict. Mediators' decisions do not impose the will of the court
146
upon the parties.
An application of the scale metaphor will further illustrate the
difficulties inherent in the court's analysis. From the furthest distance, it is simple to conclude that judges resolve conflict, the
same as mediators. Perhaps it results from the court having to
deal with a crowded docket. Consequently, judges spend less
and less time actually trying cases and more and more time managing their dockets. In an effort to deal with this situation, more
and more courts are employing court-annexed ADR programs.
Since judges and mediators are all in the conflict resolution business, the argument goes, mediators are the same as judges and
should get immunity for what they do. In order to encompass the
work of mediators and other neutrals within the ambit of quasijudicial immunity, the court had to examine the work of judges
and mediators using the very largest scale. This is evident from
the conclusion in Howard v. Drapkin:
We therefore hold that absolute quasi-judicial immunity is
properly extended to these neutral third-parties for their conduct in performing dispute resolution services which are connected to the judicial process and involve either (1) the
making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings or recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration, mediation,
conciliation, evaluation or other similar resolution of pending
disputes. As the defendant was clearly engaged in this latter
activity, she is entitled to the protection of such quasi-judicial
144 Id. at 907 (citing with approval Forrester,484 U.S. at 219).

271 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
Some mediators, through the strength of their personality or skills, may be
thought to impose a solution upon the parties due to their persuasive power, but this
does not detract from the fundamental distinction between adjudication and media145
146

tion. Cf. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK,DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 7 (2d ed. 1997).
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immunity.147

The court examined the judicial acts through binoculars, except it held them backwards and looked the wrong way. The majority did not examine the role of judges and mediators at an
appropriate scale. The appropriate scale requires an analysis of
the actor's conduct in terms of the tests for judicial immunity.
Further, the appropriate scale requires an examination of the act
in the terms used by the Supreme Court in Forrester v. White,
which framed judicial acts in terms of "rendering decisions" that
invoke the authority and power of the court.' 48 Whether it is a
dismissal, monetary judgment, summary judgment, defendant's
verdict, dissolution of a business relationship, protective order,
or other declaration of rights from among the huge panoply of
remedies available to the court, the key to the judicial act is an
imposition of the court's will on the parties involved in the action
before it.
The case law on judicial immunity reflects that the proper focus is the scale of power-invoking decisions and not the broader
focus of conflict resolution. As the California Court of Appeals
stated in Forresterv. White,149 judges must be free to render impartial and independent decisions. 50 Further, in Stump,151 the
Supreme Court stated that "it is only for acts performed in his
'judicial' capacity that a judge is absolutely immune."' 5 2 It was in
Stump that the Supreme Court established the normal function
test for judicial acts, 53 but it wrote this test in the context of a
petition to have the young woman sterilized. The context and
the scale are crucial to understanding the court's decision:
State judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are
called upon in their official capacity to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, as for example, a petition to settle
147

271 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (emphasis added).

148 484 U.S. at 226-27.

Id. at 219; see supra discussion accompanying notes 128-40.
271 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (quoting with approval Forrester, 484 U.S. at
226-27).
151 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
152 Id. at 360.
153 The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an
act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity.
Id. at 362.
149

150 Howard,
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a minor's claim. Furthermore, as even respondents have admitted, at the time he approved the petition presented to him
by Mrs. McFarlin, Judge Stump was "acting as a county circuit
court judge." We may infer from the record that it was only
because Judge Stump served in that position that Mrs. McFarlin, on the advice of counsel, submitted the petition to him for
his approval. Because Judge Stump performed the type of act
normally performed only by judges and because he did so in
his capacity as a Circuit Court Judge, we find no merit to respondents' argument that the informality with which he proceeded rendered his action
nonjudicial and deprived him of
1 54
his absolute immunity.
Cases previously discussed illustrate this point further. 15 5 In
the Butz and Imbler progeny, some actors were immune, such as
probation officers,

56

while others, such as school board members

who were participating in a student disciplinary process, were
not.' 5 7 Examined from from the largest scale, each actor was
resolving disputes, but not all were accorded immunity for their
acts. From a smaller scale, each actor was making decisions that
impacted the lives of individuals. Since some actors were immune and some were not, the courts involved in those cases must
have examined the nature of the decision-making and not just
whether the actors were resolving conflict.
B.

Wagshal v. Foster

In Wagshal v. Foster, the D.C. Circuit was faced with a claim
that Mark Foster, a court-appointed neutral case evaluator, had
forced Jerome S. Wagshal to settle at a disadvantageously low
figure. 58 The district court held that the neutral case evaluator
was absolutely immune and dismissed the action.' 5 9 In affirming
154 Id. at 362-63.
155 See supra Part
156 Id.

I.B.-C.

157 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (granting, instead, quasi-immunity for
acts where the illegality under the Constitution of statutes was not clearly spelled
out).
158 28 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court noted the distinctions and
similarities between mediators and neutral case evaluators and used the terms
interchangeably.
Each acts as a neutral third party assisting the parties to a dispute in exploring the possibility of settlement, the principal difference being that implicit in the name: the case evaluator focuses on helping the parties assess
their cases, while the mediator acts more directly to explore settlement
possibilities.
Id.159at 1250, n.2.
Id. at 1251.
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the trial court, the court used three factors for determining
whether to grant quasi-judicial immunity,1 6 ° derived from Butz
and distilled in Simons v. Bellinger:16 1
[wihether the functions of the official in question are comparable to those of a judge; (2) whether the nature of the controversy is intense enough that future harassment or intimidation
by litigants is a realistic prospect; and (3) whether the system
contains safeguards which are adequate to justify dispensing
damage suits to control unconstitutional
with private
1 62
conduct.

This reasoning gathers an eclectic gaggle of justifications for
granting immunity. The first reason resembles the judicial act
test, the second is gathered from policy, and the third is a new
test totally unrelated to the jurisprudential history of judicial immunity. This collage of judicial artwork suffers less from a lack
of detailed reasoning and more from myopic, post-hoc
rationalization.
In determining that the neutral case evaluator's functions are
160 Id. The Supreme Court, in Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985),
derived six factors from Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978):
And in Butz the Court mentioned the following factors, among others, as
characteristic of the judicial process and to be considered in determining
absolute as contrasted with qualified immunity: (a) the need to assure that
the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c)
insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the
adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on
appeal.
It is not too difficult to boil this effort down to the three-part test announced in
Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
161 643 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("First, 'the functional comparability' of an
official's judgments to those of a judge is a sine qua non of falling within the umbrella of 'quasi-judicial immunity.' Second, the nature of the controversy in which
the official is forced to become a participant must be sufficiently intense so that
there is a realistic prospect of continuing harassment or intimidation by disappointed
litigants. And, third, the system in which the official operates must contain safeguards adequate 'to reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct."') (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (citations
omitted).
It is interesting that the court used the analysis from Butz that was developed by
the Supreme Court to extend quasi-judicial immunity to administrative law judges
and hearing examiners in the executive branch of government. It is not clear why
the court did not apply the normal two-part, judicial act/jurisdiction analysis from
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), or Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225
(1988), that deals with affairs in the judiciary.
162 Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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comparable to that of a judge, the court focused only on collateral aspects, such as identifying issues and scheduling motions, 163
even though Wagshal's complaint had nothing to do with these
issues."6 Instead of focusing on the decisions made by the neutral, the court examined the neutral's mental activities and
equated them to those of judges. "Further, viewed as mental activities, the tasks appear precisely the same as those judges perform going about the business of adjudication and case
management.' 1 65 This constitutes an absolutely unique and bizarre construction within the jurisprudence surrounding judicial
immunity. Instead of focusing on actions of judges or other actors, the court turned to the neutral's mental activities.
Opposed to the reasoning of the Wagshal court, the Supreme
Court in Butz found that judges and federal hearing examiners
were "functionally comparable" because they "may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions.' 1 66 The Court continued
by stating that "the process of agency adjudication is currently
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his
independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from
pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency.' 167
These comparisons are hardly collateral, but they are central to
the normal functions of judges and hearing examiners.
It is impossible to equate neutral case evaluators or mediators
with judges by just comparing the scheduling of discovery, the
coordination of settlement hearings, or even the neutral's mental
activities. Neutral case evaluators or mediators aid the parties to
communicate and, hopefully, reach mutually agreeable settlements. Judges decide cases and impose the jurisdiction of the
court upon the parties. 1 68 Mediators do not impose resolutions
upon parties and have no jurisdiction to impose upon the parties. 16 9 Using the Butz analysis, a neutral is not "functionally
Id.
164Id. at 1251.
165 Id. at 1252.
166 438 U.S. at 513.
163

167 Id.

168 RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 146, at 2 ("[Court], the most familiar process to lawyers, features a third party with power to impose a solution upon the

disputants.");

STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 4 (3d ed. 1999).
169 WIs. STAT. ANN.§ 93.50(3)(f) (West 2000) ("The function of the mediator is to

encourage a voluntary settlement among the parties. The mediator may not compel
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comparable" to a judge. The first consideration from Butz has
certainly not been met.
To fulfill the second consideration of the three-part test, the
neutral must be subject to the realistic prospect of harassing or
intimidating litigation. 7 ' The D.C. Circuit found that "[c]onduct
of pre-trial case evaluation and mediation also seems likely to in-

spire efforts by disappointed litigants to recoup their losses, or at
any rate harass the mediator, in a second forum."17' 1 Conjecture
such as this would not be admissible in the trial court absent
some empirical support, of which the court cited none. In fact,
that the likeliMichael Moffitt, in a cogent analysis, concludes1 72
hood of success of such suits is extremely small.

The vague inspiration for harassing lawsuits against mediators
is not based upon the mediator making binding decisions that
draw the ire of disputants, but merely that the mediator "must
often be the bearer of unpleasant news-that a claim or defense
may be far weaker than the party supposed. ' 173 The court made
no attempt to demonstrate how a mediator merely bearing bad

news in the form of an evaluation could possibly give rise to even
an inkling of a cause of action when compared to the delivery of

such bad news in the form of a dismissal or judgment by a
court. 174

Conversely, the Butz Court characterized the judicial

a settlement."); WYo. STAT. AN. § 11-41-105(f) (Michie 1999) ("Mediators may not
compel a settlement."); see also Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for
Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81, 120 (2003) (arguing that efforts by the mediator to impose his or her will on a party to force a settlement constitutes malpractice and invites a lawsuit).
170 Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
171 Id. at 1253 (emphasis added).
172 Moffitt, supra note 11, at 200.
173 Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1253.
174 Moffitt, supra note 11, at 205. Beyond malpractice or simple negligence, a
dissatisfied party could theoretically bring a number of tort claims against a mediator. Intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, tortious interference with contractual relations and invasion of privacy each provide a possible basis
for recovery from a mediator. In practice, however, none of these exposes most
practicing mediators to sweeping liability.
In an egregious set of circumstances, a mediator could conceivably be held liable
for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on one of the parties. However, an
action under intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that the defendant
"by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes serious emotional distress to another." Mustard v. Timothy J. O'Reilly Co., Ltd., No. CA200305-059 2004 WL 192957 (Ohio App. Feb. 2, 2004). The aggressive approach some
mediators adopt in challenging parties' perceptions and assessments would not come
near to satisfying the requirements for demonstrating tortious infliction of emotional
distress.
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process as one leading to a final decision: "[C]ontroversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a
judicial decree."' 75 In Butz, the Court established immunity for
hearing examiners and administrative law judges because of the
realistic prospect that harassing litigation could arise from their
decisions that determined the legal rights and obligations of the
parties assembled before them, not because the hearing officer
may have to tell the parties bad news. In Butz, the Supreme
Court determined that the independence of the hearing officer's
decision-making would be impaired without such immunity. In
Wagshal, the D.C. Circuit extended immunity to neutral case
evaluators and mediators merely because they bear bad news
and because of the court's unfounded fear that they therefore
seemed likely to attract litigation. To satisfy the second consideration from Butz, the Wagshal court unjustifiably conflated binding adjudication and just conveying bad news.
For the third Butz factor, the court must consider whether sufficient safeguards exist to justify dispensing with civil litigation as
a means of controlling wrongful conduct.17 6 In Wagshal, Foster
had conducted one session as the case evaluator when Wagshal
claimed that Foster had lost his neutrality.17 7 When Wagshal
would not withdraw the allegation, Foster recused himself and
made a recommendation for the trial judge to continue efforts to
settle the case. 178 A second case evaluator was appointed and
the case settled. It was the settlement while using the second
neutral that caused Wagshal to complain.17 9 In finding that safeguards against wrongful conduct existed, the court stated that
Wagshal could have sought relief from the trial court judge: "The
avenues of relief institutionalized in the ADR program and its
judicial context provide adequate safeguards."' 8 ° Beyond this
vague reference to seeking relief from the judge, the court failed
to elaborate upon what these "adequate safeguards" might
entail.
Whatever safeguards might have existed in the midst of the
Wagshal settlement discussions, it is doubtful that they compare
to the safeguards contemplated by the Supreme Court in Butz.
175
176
1 77

438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252.
Id. at 1251.

178 Id.
179
ad.
180 Id. at 1253.
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Pertinent safeguards mentioned by the Court in Butz include
"the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of error on
Mediation fails on all three counts. Obviously,
appeal."''
mediators have no precedents to govern their conduct. One key
to successful mediation is the ability of the parties to avoid precedent and craft a solution to the conflict that is built around the
unique interests and needs of the parties. 182 Certainly, there are
no governing decisions that can be brought to bear in such a process to protect the parties.
Next, mediation is far from adversarial. Assertions by one side
or the other will not be "contested by their adversaries in open
court.' 1 83 It is precisely because early neutral evaluation and
mediation lack the normal aspects of adversarial proceedings
that parties are drawn to these and other forms of alternative
dispute resolution. Instead of facing off in court with their proxies sparring for every point, parties are able to sit down and discuss their needs, interests, and emotions in a calm and peaceful
exchange. The parties' ability to attempt resolution in such an
atmosphere is further enhanced by the prospect of confidentiality. 184 It is behind the doors of the mediation room, closed by
confidentiality, that mediators can misbehave, as we saw in the
two hypothetical cases at the beginning. The mediators' misconduct does not take place in an adversarial setting open to challenge by the parties.
Finally, and contrary to the Wagshal court's opinion, there is
most likely no opportunity for correction of error when a neutral
misbehaves during settlement discussions. Although Wagshal
was free to seek relief from the trial judge,185 the wrongful conduct of Foster (if there was any) may not have manifested itself
before the second session with the new case evaluator. 186 In retrospect, it seems highly unlikely that Wagshal and his counsel
were aware of a cause of action for the misconduct of Foster, yet
sat on their rights while the trial judge recused Foster and ap181 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).

182 See generally Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 705 (1997).
183 Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.
184 See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION Acr, prefatory note, in 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 1,

5 (2003).
185 Wagshal, 28 F.2d at 1253.
186 Id. at 1251.
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pointed the second neutral evaluator. It is more likely that Wagshal was unable to put two and two together until after the
settlement was signed and delivered.
Disputants who seek relief while the mediation is in process
are the ones who avoid wrongdoing by the mediator or neutral
case evaluator. If parties become aware of negligence during a
mediation session, as in the case of the Negligent Neutral, or if
parties refuse to succumb to a mediator's attempts at coercion, as
in the cage of the Pasty Participant, disputants can just withdraw
from the mediation, thereby avoiding the wrongful conduct and
obviating the need for any safeguards. On the other hand, the
Disgruntled Dealer who drew the Negligent Neutral did not become aware of the negligence until the supposed tax break
turned out to be valueless. So too, the Pasty Participant only
began to understand the damage wrought by the Misbehaving
Mediator when he was able to recover and shine the bright light
of day on the agreement. As is the nature of mediation and neutral case evaluation, disputants trade their causes of action for
contracts. By settling, the parties agree to forego their rights in
court (and rights of appeal) and, most likely, to dismiss the underlying actions with prejudice in return for agreements that
spell out each party's rights and responsibilities. Any problems
that might arise from the settlement discussions and the agreements are subsumed into the settlement agreements themselves.
Any of the normal safeguards described in Butz,187 or even the
minor safeguard relied upon by the Wagshal court, 88 evaporate
as the ink dries on the settlement documents. When this occurs,
the only relief available to a damaged party is to file a lawsuit
against the mediator or case evaluator. The decision of the Wagshal court can only be supported by a tortured misunderstanding
of the foundational premises of mediation.
The scale metaphor factors into the Wagshal decision as well.
After noting and dismissing Wagshal's protestations that mediation is nothing like "authoritative adjudication,"' 8 9 the court
states, "[h]owever true his point may be as an abstract matter,
the general process of encouraging settlement is a natural, almost
inevitable, concomitant of adjudication.' 190 Again, for a court to
438 U.S. at 512.
188 28 F.3d at 1253.
189
Id.at 1252.
190 Id.
187
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find that mediators and case evaluators are functionally
equivalent to judges, it is necessary to draw back from the scene
and examine the activities of each from the furthest distance.
With this view, the only comparison that can be made is that both
judges and neutrals resolve conflict. From this distance, judges
and third-party neutrals appear the same. If, however, you draw
any closer to their actual duties and responsibilities, the similarities fade and quickly disappear. The Wagshal court wore the
same backwards binoculars that afflicted the court in Howard v.
Drapkin. Neither court seems bothered by this extreme
farsightedness.
C.

Case Law: The Two Ironies

The decisions in Howard v. Drapkin and Wagshal v. Foster
present two ironies. First, as pointed out by Pillai,
judicial immunity is inextricably tainted by the blemish of conflict of interest. Conflict of interest is in its worst form when it
entangles judicial decisionmaking. "No man is allowed to be a
judge in his own cause," warned James Madison, "because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity."..... In the history of modern jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's decisions regarding judicial
immunity, which exempt judicial officers en masse from civil
liability and deprive citizens who are injured by their unlawful
actions of compensation, appear to be inequitable and made
solely in self-interest. 19 1
Although the conflict of interest created by mediator immunity
may not be as direct as the conflict that accompanies judicial immunity, the courts still stand to benefit from their decision. Obviously, the courts benefit from settlements and a reduced docket,
but with mediator immunity they also benefit by shedding the
risk of mediator misbehavior or the cost of insuring against such
wrongful conduct. This gain may be somewhat offset if thwarted
disputants begin to spread dissension about court-annexed mediation programs. Even so, this is a more remote problem and not
nearly as immediate as the gains that result from adopting mediator immunity and shifting the risk away from the court.
The second irony arises from the reasoning embedded in the
two decisions. Mediators may be thankful that the courts are
willing to grant immunity from any liability for their misdeeds.
Others may be laughing all the way to the bank because they
191 Pillai, supra note 16, at 106.
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need not be concerned with purchasing malpractice insurance,
especially those who receive fee-generating cases from court-annexed programs. They are not, however, rushing to sandbag the
foundations of the courts' reasoning against any impending flood
of counter-arguments. For many mediators, courts may have arrived at the right answer, but for the wrong reason. To reach the
conclusion that immunity was proper, the courts had to equate
mediators with judges, which is the opposite of what mediators
have been trying to do for three decades. "The mediator, in contrast to the arbitrator or judge, has no power to impose an out192
come on disputing parties.'
Mediators frequently are confronted with questions from disputants related to their role. They ask, "Are you going to decide
our case for us?" Or, "Are you going to tell us how we have to
resolve this matter?" Disputants pose these questions even after
the mediator has finished an opening statement in which he or
she disavows any role in deciding these cases. 1 93 Further, any
conduct that looks like that of a judge may be highly problematic. Telling the parties how they should settle or threatening to
make a recommendation to the judge about resolution may constitute the very actionable behavior for which the mediator has
just been granted immunity. In fact, if mediators did impose
their will upon the parties to settle, it would constitute coercion
and would most likely be actionable, 194 similar to the facts in the
Misbehaving Mediator and the Pasty Participant.
In summary, mediators understand they are not judges. They
are trained that the principal goal of mediation is self-determination and, as such, they must disavow any resemblance to judges
and judging. 195 Finally, if mediators attempt to act like judges by
192 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 168, at 123.
193 See MARK BENNETT & MICHELE HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION

37
(1996) (recommending that the mediator might consider covering the parties' role in
decision-making in the opening monologue by saying to the disputants, "We want
you to make a good decision, but we will not tell you what to do, nor will we make
recommendations").
194 Moffitt, supra note 169, at 120 (arguing that efforts by the mediator to impose
his or her will on a party to force a settlement constitutes malpractice and invites a
lawsuit).
195 MODEL STANDARDS

OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS,

Standard I (American

Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution 1994) ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to
reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Any party may withdraw from mediation
at any time."); Revised Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Standard I (Joint Coin-
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imposing their will upon the parties, they risk creating civil liabil-

ity.19 6 It is disingenuous for mediators to accept the protections
of immunity, the jurisprudential basis of which depends upon
equating their role with that of judges.
III
STATUTES

&

RULES PROVIDING FOR

MEDIATOR IMMUNITY

A.

Description and Analysis

Immunity provisions fall along two continua. One relates to
the scope of mediation programs; it ranges from general programs that cover all mediation in a state to those created for specific types of disputes. The other continuum relates to the range
of mediator misconduct covered by the immunity provisions.
With regards to the scope of mediation programs with mediator
immunity, we were able to locate ninety-six statutes or rules for
mediation programs with immunity provisions in thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia. 1 97 Twenty-one provisions
(from eighteen states) can be found within general programs,
covering statewide programs or broad-based court-annexed promittee Draft, January 2004) ("A mediator shall conduct a mediation as to both process and outcome based on the principle of party self-determination."). See
BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 193, at 37 ("We will not make judgments about
who is right and who is wrong.").
196 Moffitt, supra note 169, at 120.
197 See infra Appendix. Twenty-two

states had more than one provision, with the
Tennessee won the competition for most
two.
only
having
those
of
vast majority
immunity provisions, with four: one general and three specialized programs. No
attempt was made to count or analyze immunity provisions contained within nonbinding arbitration or non-binding-like arbitration programs such as commercial
conciliation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.432 (West 2003) (providing full
immunity for conciliators of international commercial disputes); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 672-9 (2003) (stating that "[n]o member of a design professional conciliation panel
shall be liable in damages for libel, slander, or other defamation of character of any
party to the design professional conciliation panel proceeding for any action taken
or any decision, conclusion, finding, or recommendation made by the member while
acting as a member of a design professional conciliation panel under this chapter").
The counting and classification of statutes and rules is far from an exact science.
For instance, do two provisions located in the same section or chapter count as one
or two statutes? We counted them as one statute if they referred to the same program or were in the same code chapter. Further, is a program for court-annexed
mediation in the civil court of general jurisdiction a general or specific program?
We counted them as general programs. The difficulty arises from the huge diversity
in programs developed and language utilized for these statutes and rules. A second
evaluation may change these numbers slightly in any direction. The review was
completed only to provide a backdrop for the analysis of immunity.
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grams for civil actions. 198 General mediation programs often
cover mediation at any stage of a conflict. 199 Some, while contained within court-related statutes, enable mediation whether or
not an action has been filed."00 Other generalized statutes cover
only disputes after an action has been commenced. 20 '
A total of seventy-five provisions (from thirty-two states) can
be found within specialized programs, 02 including victim/offender, 2 3 business and technology,20 4 appellate 2 5 domestic relations, °6 workers compensation, 0 7 and health care.20 8 Five states
have programs for farmer-lender disputes. 0 9 Programs in narrower areas of conflict include those for mediating disputes involving special education, 1 0 attorney admission and discipline, 1 '
198 See infra Appendix and under each state examine the category for programs

listed as "general."
199 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 679C.4 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-513 (2003); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-2915 (2003).
200 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-305(6) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.75.100(2) (2004).
201 See, e.g., DEL. Sup. C'r. R. Civ. P. 16.1(n); FLA. STAT. ch. 44.107 (2003); GA.
ADR R. VII(C); W. VA. TR. Cr. R. 25.13; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-104 (Michie
2003).
202 Because many states have both general and specialized programs, the total
number of states with an immunity provision in a general program (18) and the
number of states with provisions in a specialized program (33) exceeds the total
number of states with immunity provisions (38). For instance, Arizona has a mediation statute found in the evidence code that was counted as a general program
(ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-2238(E) (2003)), as well as specific mediation programs for
mediation of appellate disputes (ARIz. R. Civ. APP. P. 30(o)) and mediation of disputes involving admission and discipline of attorneys (ARIz. Sup. CT. R. 48(1)).
203
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9505(b) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-105
(2004).
204
DEL. CH. Cr. R. 95.
205
ARIZ. R. Civ. App. P. 30(o); MorT. CODE ANN. § 25 ch. 21 R. 54(d) (2003);
N.Y. Sup. Cr. App. Div. CT. R., Part 1220, App. A(5)(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A38.10) (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-6(4) (2004).
206 MINN. STAT. § 518.1751(5) (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-12.6 (West 2004)
(providing for mediation of disputes arising from the Parent's Education Programs
for dissolutions involving children); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.4A(h) (2004); W. VA.
R. PRAC. & PROC. FAM. Cr. MED. 45.
207 IOWA CODE § 679C.4 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-168(2)(b) (2003).
208 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-4-115(g), 63-6-214(i)(3), 63-7-115(c)(3) (2004); Wis.
STAT. § 655.465(6) (2003).
209 IOWA CODE § 13.16(1) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 583.26(7)(a) (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 6.09.10-04.1 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-13-20 (Michie 2003); Wis.
STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (2003). Mississippi and Montana had immunity provisions in
their farmer-lender mediation programs, but both programs have been repealed.
1990 Miss. Laws 496; 1989 Mont. Laws 269.
210
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 7207-C (West 2003).
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automobile merchandising,2 12 contracts for property 2 14insurance,213 recreational vehicle manufacturers and dealers, mo2 16
215 and the licensing of podiatrists.
bile home park tenancies

Five states have immunity provisions contained in programs for
county- or community-based mediation centers.217 Finally, a few
states have local rules that create programs limited to certain
counties or judicial districts.218
The second continuum covers the degree of immunity afforded
mediators, ranging from statutes creating full immunity to provisions that severely limit coverage to little beyond negligent be-

havior. Although the diversity of programs containing immunity
provisions is pronounced, the spectrum of potentially actionable
conduct protected by immunity rules and statutes is even broader
and more varied. At one end of the continuum, fifty-four provi-

sions (from twenty-four states) provide immunity similar to that
of judges, while at the other end of the continuum, forty-two provisions (from twenty-five states) extend only qualified or lesser
forms of protection. At the former end of the continuum, only
Hawaii phrases its immunity provision in terms of absolute immunity,2 19 while Tennessee extends full immunity by stating that

acting as a neutral is a "judicial function. ''22 1 Several states legis-

late immunity to the "same extent as judges,"'22 1 while others
211 COLO. R. Civ. P. 251.32(e); ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 48(1); WASH. ADMISSION To
PRACTICE R. 16(e)(1).
212

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-301.1(b)(3) (2004); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 818.11(c)

(2004); Wis. STAT. § 218.0138 (2003).
213 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7015(5) (West 2003).
21 4
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1440(5) (West 2003).
215 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.038(9) (West 2003).
216 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/4(B) (2004).
2 17
FLA. STAT. ch. 44.201(6) (West 2003); IowA CODE § 679.13 (2003); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 691.1557a (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2915 (2003); TEx. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.055 (Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.100(2)

(2003).
218 N.M.2D J. DIST. R. LR2-601(E); Fla. 9th J. Cir. Admin. Order 2001-34; ILL.
19TH J. CIR. R 11.13(n); OHIO CUYAHOGA COUNTY C.P. DOM. REL. R. 32(E)(4);
CIR. CT. ADR R. 8(i); S.C. FAM. CT. MEDIATION R. 7(i).
S.C.
2 19

HAW. APP. CONF. PROG. R. 9.
220"TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 § 12 ("Activity of Rule 31 Neutrals in the course of Rule
31 ADR proceedings shall be deemed the performance of a judicial function and for
such acts Rule 31 Neutrals shall be entitled to judicial immunity.").

221 FLA. STAT. ch. 44.107(1) (2003) (" . .. judicial immunity in the same manner

and to the same extent as a judge"); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(f) (West 2003)
("In any arbitration or mediation conducted pursuant to this article by the State Bar
or by a local bar association, pursuant to rules of procedure approved by the board
of governors, an arbitrator or mediator, as well as the arbitrating association and its
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provide mediators immunity from suit, 2 2 2 immunity within the
scope of appointment, 223 or within their "powers and duties. 224
Still others phrase immunity in terms of freedom from liability,22 5
and Kentucky, while not calling it immunity as such, requires that
parties hold the mediator harmless for "any action arising out of
the procedures set forth by this rule and for any and all conduct
of the... mediator.., presiding over the procedures herein. ' 22 6
Moving down the continuum toward limited immunity, the
forms of qualified immunity are even more diverse. Several
states provide for immunity except in cases of willful or wanton
directors, officers, and employees, shall have the same immunity which attaches in
judicial proceedings."); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 99(b)(1); IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-4 (2003)
(". . . immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge having jurisdiction in Indiana"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-21 R. 54(d) (2003) (".... shall enjoy
such judicial immunity as the Montana Supreme Court would enjoy if performing
the same functions"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(j) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20.301.1(b)(3) (2004); UTAH R.J. ADMIN. 4-510(13) ("An ADR provider acting as
a mediator... in cases under the ADR program shall be immune from liability to the
same extent as judges of this state ...");W. VA. R. PRAC. & PROC. FAM. CT. MED.
45 ("Mediators and premediation screeners shall have immunity in the same manner
and to the same extent as a family court judge.").
222 N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170(e) ("The litigants and counsel must recognize that the
neutrals will not be acting as legal advisors or legal representatives. They must further recognize that, because the neutrals are performing quasi-judicial functions and
are performing under the auspices of the Court, each such neutral has immunity
from suit ....").
223 N.M. 2D J. DIST. R. LR2-601(E) ("Attorneys and other persons appointed by
the court to serve as settlement facilitators, arbitrators or mediators or in other such
roles ... are immune from liability for conduct within the scope of their appointment"); N.Y. Sup. CT. COMM. Div. ADR R. 6 ("Any person designated to serve as
Neutral pursuant to these rules shall be immune from suit based upon any actions
engaged in or omissions made while serving in that capacity."); N.Y. Sup. CT. App.
Div. CT. R., Part 1220, App. A(5)(d) ("The mediator will not be liable for any act or
omission while serving as approved volunteer mediator except for willful misconduct."); Wis. STAT. § 218.0138 (2003) ("A mediator or arbitrator is immune from
civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the mediator's or
arbitrator's performance of his or her powers and duties under s. 218.0136 ....").
224 Wis. STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (2003) ("Mediators and arbitrators are immune from
civil liability for any act or omission within the scope of their performance of their
powers and duties under this section.").
225 FLA. BAR R. 14-7.1 ("[Mlediators ...shall have absolute immunity from civil
liability for all acts within the course of their official duties."); N.D. CENT. CODE

§ 6.09.10-04.1 (2004) ("The board, commissioner, administrator, staff, negotiators,
and mediators are not subject to any liability arising from any actions undertaken
regarding a farmer, creditor, or other person in attempting to reach a settlement.");
S.C. CIR. CT. ADR R. 8(i) ("The mediator shall not be liable to any person for any
act or omission in connection with any mediation conducted under these rules.").
226 Ky. Sup. Cr. R. 3.815(10).
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misconduct, 2 27 while Iowa and Michigan add both the lower standard of bad faith and the higher one of maliciousness to the
list.22 Others, including Delaware, 22 9 Georgia, 230 Kansas, 231 and
New Jersey,23 2 provide a laundry list of wrongful conduct limiting
immunity. Virginia's immunity statute for court-annexed programs is typical of this approach:
When a mediation is provided by a mediator who is certified
pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Judicial Council of
Virginia... then that mediator... shall be immune from civil
liability for, or resulting from, any act or omission ...

unless

the act or omission was made or done in bad faith, with mali227 ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 16-7-207 (Michie 2003);

NEB. REV. ST.

§ 25-2915 (2003);

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-168(2)(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-105 (2003); TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.055 (Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE

§ 7.75.100 (2004).
228 IOWA CODE § 679.13 (2003) ("No mediator, employee or agent of a center, or
member of a center's board may be held liable for civil damages for any statement
or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless the mediator, employee,
agent or member acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property."). MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 691.1557a (2003) ("A mediator of a community dispute resolution
center shall not be liable for civil damages for any act or omission in the scope of his
or her employment or function as a mediator, unless he or she acted in bad faith or
with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the
rights, safety or property of another.").
229 DEL. CH. CT. R. 95(c) ("Mediators shall be immune from civil liability for or
resulting from any act or omission done or made in connection with efforts to assist
or facilitate a mediation, unless the act or omission was made or done in bad faith,
with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the
rights, safety, or property of another."); see also DEL. CH. CT. R. 174; DEL. SuP. CT.
R. Civ. P. 16.1(n); DEL. CT. COM. PL. Civ. R. 16.1(n).
230 GA. ADR R. VII(C) ("No neutral in a court-annexed or court-referred program shall be held liable for civil damages for any statement, action, or omission or
decision made in the course of any ADR process unless that statement, action, omission or decision is 1) grossly negligent and made with malice or 2) is in willful disregard of the safety or property of any party to the ADR process.").
231 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-513 (2003) ("No neutral person, staff member, or member of a governing board of an approved program may be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless
such person acts, or fails to act, in a manner constituting gross negligence with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights, safety or
property of any party to the process of dispute resolution.").
232 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-12.6(a) (West 2003) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary, no person serving as a program representative in
the 'Parents' Education Program' . . . shall be liable for damages resulting from an
exercise of judgment or discretion in connection with the person's duties unless the
actions are fraudulent or evidence a reckless disregard for the duties imposed by the
position. Nothing in the this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any program representative causing damage by that person's willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission.").
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cious intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton
disre233
gard of the rights, safety or property of another.

New Jersey's dispute resolution program for parents' education contains some very convoluted language:
[N]o person serving as a program representative in the "Parents' Education Program"

. .

. shall be liable for damages re-

sulting from an exercise of judgment or discretion in
connection with the person's duties unless the actions are
fraudulent or evidence a reckless disregard for the duties imposed by the position. Nothing in this section shall be deemed
to grant immunity to any program representative causing damage by that person's willful wanton or grossly negligent act of

commission or omission.23of

While some states have provisions phrased in terms of bad
faith, 35 language in Maine,2 3 6 Pennsylvania, 3 7 and Wisconsin2 38
creates a presumption of good faith that can only be overcome
with clear and convincing evidence.
If the two continua (one for program coverage and the other
for conduct coverage) are used as the x-y axes of a grid, four
239
possibilities arise, as shown on the table:
233 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.23 (Michie 2004).
234 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-12.6(a) (West 2003).
235 IOWA CODE § 679C.4 (2003); MicH. Comp. LAws § 691.1557a

(2004); OR.
36.210(1) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.9 (Michie 2004).
236 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1440(5) (West 2003) ("A mediator or arbitrator
is immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of
the mediator's or arbitrator's performance of powers and duties under this section.
Every act or omission is presumed to be a good faith act or omission. This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.").
REV. STAT. §

237 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 818.11(c) (West 2003) ("A mediator or arbitrator is

immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the
mediator's or arbitrator's performance of his powers and duties under this section.
Every act or omission of a mediator or arbitrator is presumed to be a good faith act
or omission. This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence.").
238 Wis. STAT. § 218.0138 (2003) ("A mediator or arbitrator is immune from civil
liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the mediator's or
arbitrator's performance of his or her powers and duties under s. 218.0136 ....
Every act or omission of a mediator or arbitrator is presumed to be a good faith act
or omission. This presumption my be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence.").
239 The rules for the U.S. District Court for the Southern and Eastern District of
New York are not counted in the totals shown in the table because the exact extent
of immunity provided by law is not clear from the rules themselves. U.S. DIST. CT.
S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 83.11(g) ("Mediators shall be immune from liability or suit with
respect to their conduct as such to the maximum extent permitted by applicable
law.").
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FULL IMMUNITY-

FULL IMMUNITY-

GENERAL PROGRAM

SPECIFIC PROGRAM

7 PROVISIONS IN 7 STATES

47 PROVISIONS

__________________________

IN

22

I..

LIMITED IMMUNITY-

LIMITED IMMUNITY-

GENERAL PROGRAM

SPECIFIC PROGRAM

14

28

PROVISIONS IN 11 STATES

STATES

PROVISIONS IN

17

STATES

Interestingly, the upper left quadrant for general programs
with full immunity is the least populated with only seven states
providing full immunity for general programs,24 ° with three of
these states creating immunity to the "same extent as a judge. "241
The remaining eleven states with general programs limit protection (lower left quadrant),242 such as by the Arizona statute
which does not protect against "intentional misconduct or reckless disregard of a substantial risk of a significant injury to the
rights of others, ' 243 and by the Iowa statute that does not cover
conduct "made in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manor wanton disregard of human rights,
ner exhibiting willful
244
property.
or
safety,
The right hand side of the grid, representing specific programs,
has a much larger number of total provisions and number of
24 0

ch. 44.107 (2003); IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-4 (2004); ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 4, § 18-B(3) (West 2003); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170(e); N.Y. Sup. CT. COMM.
Div. ADR R. 6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(j) (2003); TENN. Sup. CT. R. 31 § 12; W.
VA. TR. Cr. R. 25.13.
241 FLA. STAT. ch. 44.107 (2003); IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-4 (2003); W. VA. TR. CT.
R. 25.13 (creating immunity "to the same extent as a circuit judge").
242 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238(E) (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-207 (Michie
2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-305(6) (2003); DEL. Sup. CT. R. Civ. P. 16.1(n);
GA. ADR R. VII(C); IOWA CODE § 679C.4 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-513 (2003);
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.210(1), (2) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.264 (2003); VA CODE
ANN. § 8.01-576.9 (Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.23 (Michie 2003); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-43-104 (Michie 2003).
2 43
ARIZ REV. STAT. § 12-2238(E) (2004).
2 44
IOWA CODE § 679C.4 (2003).
ANN.

FLA. STAT.
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states represented. The two right hand quadrants have a total of
seventy-five statutes and rules from thirty-two states. Of all the
rules and statutes creating some form of mediator immunity,
more than seventy-five percent of them have been crafted for
specialized programs. And, of the specialty provisions, slightly
more than sixty percent have granted mediators absolute immunity. This contrasts with the one-third of the general programs
that grant absolute immunity. In the creation of mediation programs, drafters are much more willing to extend absolute immunity for specialty programs than for general programs.
Next, let us examine the level of consistency of the immunity
provisions in the states with multiple rules and statutes. Of the
total of thirty-eight states with immunity provisions, thirteen
states and the District of Columbia have only one provision. Of
the remaining twenty-five states with multiple provisions,2 45 sixty
percent (sixteen) maintain reasonable consistency with regards to
the degree of immunity granted mediators within their mediation
programs and the broad categories provided by the matrix.
These states can be categorized by those with provisions that all
land in one quadrant (i.e. specialized programs with limited immunity) and those with provisions that land in horizontal quadrants, but maintain the same degree of immunity (i.e. general and
specialized programs both with full immunity or both with similar limited immunity). First, eight states have provisions in only
one quadrant.246 For instance, Minnesota has two specialized
mediation programs: one for resolving disputes between farmers
and lenders and one for resolving parenting time disputes, both
of which grant the mediators full immunity.247 South Carolina
has two court-annexed programs for certain counties; both programs utilize identical language to grant full immunity. 24 Unfortunately, while Washington's provisions are both within the
quadrant for specialized programs with limited immunity, the
state failed to create complete uniformity. Washington has a pro245 Although Colorado has three listings, the entry for international dispute resolution was not counted because the provision deals with immunity from process
while in the state for a mediation and does not deal with mediator immunity directly.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-507 (2003).
246 See infra Appendix for Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington.
247 MINN. STAT. § 518.1751(5) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 583.26(7)(a) (2003).

248 S.C. CIR. CT. ADR R. 8(i) ("The mediator shall not be liable to any person for
any act or omission in connection with any mediation conducted under these
rules.").
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gram for mediation by authorized dispute resolution centers that
protects their volunteers for all but "willful or wanton misconduct." '4 9 On the other hand, the program for mediation of attorney-client and attorney-professional disputes extends protection
for acts done in "good faith." '
Second, eight states have provisions in both general and specialized programs (in two quadrants), with six maintaining consistency by having all provisions provide for either full or limited
immunity, but never both." 1 Utah has two provisions that provide full immunity, but in different ways. The general program
for court-annexed mediation provides for immunity "to the same
extent as judges,"25 while the appellate mediation program invokes the Governmental Immunity Act.253
Two states had problems maintaining consistency. Delaware
has four court rules that limit immunity with a laundry list of
wrongful conduct. For instance, immunity in the general program for court-annexed mediation in the Delaware Superior
Court does not extend to acts that are "in bad faith, with malicious intent, or exhibit a willful or wanton disregard of the rights,
safety, or property of another." '54 Conversely, the victim-offender mediation statute provides immunity that covers all but
'
"willful or wanton misconduct."255
In Oregon, the situation is somewhat the reverse. Two state
statutes setting up general programs for court-annexed mediation
provide for immunity unless an "act or omission was made or
done in bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting
a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety or property of
'
The U.S. District Court took the opposite approach
another."256
its
specialized program for court-annexed mediation
in creating
by equating mediators to officers of the court with judicial
immunity.257
249 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.100(2) (2003).
250 WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACrICE R. 16(e)(1).

251 See infra Appendix for Indiana, North Carolina, and West Virginia for examples of full immunity. See infra Appendix for Georgia, Iowa, and Wyoming for examples of identical limited immunity.
252 UTAH R. J. ADMIN. 4-510 (13).
253 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-6(4) (2004).
254 DEL. Sup. CT. R. Civ. P. 16.1(n); see also DEL. CH. CT. R. 95(c); DEL. CH. CT.
R. 174; DEL. Cr. COM. PL. Civ. R. 16.1(c).
255 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9505(b) (2004).

256 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.210(1), 36.264 (2003).
257 U.S. DIST. CT. D. OR. Civ. R. 16.4(e)(2)(C) ("During the conduct of court
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The problems Delaware and Oregon face pale when compared
with the inconsistent provisions in the remaining ten states with
multiple immunity provisions. Arizona's appellate mediation
program and the program for mediation of disputes regarding
admission and discipline of attorneys provide mediators with absolute immunity, 58 while the general mediation statute found in
the evidence chapter limits immunity by providing coverage for
all conduct "except for those acts or omissions that involve intentional misconduct or reckless disregard of a substantial risk of a
'
significant injury to the rights of others."259
Colorado suffers a
similar problem. Its specialized program for mediation of attorney discipline matters provides for full immunity for "conduct in
the course of [mediators'] official duties, 26 ° while the general
program under the state Dispute Resolution Act limits immunity
to conduct 26that
does not constitute "willful or wanton
1
misconduct.

The problems in Florida are more of a mixed bag. The general
program for court-ordered mediation and the mandatory small
claims mediation program provide for full immunity to the "same
extent as a judge, 262 while the statute establishing Citizen Dispute Settlement Centers within the judicial districts provides immunity "unless such person acted in bad faith or with malicious
purpose or in manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
'
the rights, safety, or property of another."263
Illinois has three
specialized programs: two court-annexed programs provide immunity to the "same extent as a judge, ' 26 while the program for
mediation of licensing disputes for podiatrists provides immunity
"except in cases involving willful or wanton misconduct."265
'
In
Maine, both the general court-annexed program and the special
directed mediation, mediators act as officers of the court and have judicial
immunity.").
258
ARIz. R. Civ. App. P. 30(o) ("Appellate mediators ... involved in the Program shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the course of their
official duties."). ARIZ. Sup. Cr. R. 48(1) ("[M]ediators ... shall be immune from
suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties.").
259
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238(E) (2003).
260
COLO. R. Civ. P. 251.32(e).
261 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-22-305(6) (2003).
262
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 44.107 (Harrison 2003). See also Fla. 9th J. Cir. Admin.
Order 2001-34 (providing mediators in small claims cases in Orange County with
the2 63same immunity).
FLA. STAT. ch. 44.201(6) (2003).
264 ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 99(b); ILL. 18TH J. CIR. Cr. R. 15.18(I)(K).
265 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/4(B) (2004).
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education program provide for full immunity, 266 but the program

for disputes involving recreational vehicle manufacturers and
dealers covers only acts done in good faith.26 7
In New York, the local court rule for a court-annexed media-

tion program in the New York County Supreme Court Commercial Division provides for full immunity,2 6 8 but the court rule

providing immunity for mediators in attorney-client disputes
does not cover willful misconduct.2 6 9 Oklahoma and Wisconsin
suffer a similar disconnect with two specialized programs. In

Oklahoma, the court-annexed program for disputes of "small social or economic magnitude" provides only limited immunity for
an action that is not the "result of gross negligence with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights,
safety, or property of any party to the mediation,"27 while the
specialized program for victim/offender disputes provides
mediators full immunity.2 7 ' In Wisconsin, the farmer/lender me-

diation program provides that "[m]ediators... are immune from
civil liability for any act or omission within the scope of their
performance of their powers and duties,

'272

while both the spe-

cialized program for mediation of disputes between motor vehicle dealers, salespersons, and sales finance companies and the
program for disputes involving heath care extend immunity only
to acts or omissions that are done in good faith.27 3

Finally, the rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court that create
the court-annexed mediation program provide full judicial immunity,274 while the statutory immunity provisions contained in
266 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 18-B (3) (West 2004) (pertaining to the courtannexed program); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 7207-C (West 2003) (pertaining
to the licensing of podiatrists).
267 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1440(5) (West 2003) (creating a presumption of

good
faith that can "be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence").
268
N.Y. Sup. Cr. COMM. Div. ADR R. 6 ("Any person designated to serve as
Neutral pursuant to these rules shall be immune from suit based upon any actions
engaged in or omissions made while serving in that capacity.") Although this provision provides for immunity for acts or omissions while serving in the capacity of a
neutral, this is no different from the judicial act test for judicial immunity within the
common law. See supra Part I.B.1.
269 N.Y. Sup. CT. App. Div. Cr. R., Part 1220, App. A(5)(d).
270 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1801, 1805(E) (2004).
271 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(m) (2004).

272 WIs. STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (2003).
273 WIS. STAT. § 218.0138 (2003) (providing that the presumption of good faith
can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence). WiS. STAT. § 655.465(6)
(2003).
27 4
TENN. SUP. Cr. R. 31

§ 12.
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three specialized programs all provide for limited immunity.
Even within the specialized programs, no consistency exists. The
victim-offender program covers all conduct except "willful or
wanton misconduct, '27 5 but mediators involved in disputes over

licensure of chiropractors and in disputes involving other healthrelated boards are provided protection only so long as they act
276
"in good faith and without malice.

There is one area of relative consistency. In the twelve local
federal rules contained in the Appendix and counted in all of the

various state totals, the U.S. district and bankruptcy courts (with
one rather amazing exception) have all provided for full immunity for their court-annexed mediators.2 7 7 The one exception is

remarkable. Of the ninety-six provisions found in the statutes,
rules, and local rules, only the local rule for the U.S. District

Court for Idaho specifically rejects immunity for mediators.
While granting immunity for arbitrators, it states, "Mediators are
not afforded this same protection.

278

The vast inconsistency among immunity provisions within individual states, as well as between different states, presents a

nearly impenetrable jungle obscuring the current status of mediator immunity in the United States. Where states attempt to establish absolute immunity, in addition to invoking some
derivation of the word absolute,2 7 9 they recite "judicial func-

tion,

28 °

"the same extent as judges, ' 281 "immunity from suit," 282

'
"within the scope of ...duties, 283
'
and "powers and duties."284

275 TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-105(b) (2004).
276 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-4-115(g) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-138(b)
(2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-4-118 (2003).
277 See supra Appendix for local rules of the U.S. district courts in Alaska, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, and South Carolina.
278 U.S. DIST. CT. D. IDAHO Civ. R. 16.5(g).

279 See, e.g., ARIz. R. Civ. APP. P. 30(o) ("Appellate mediators.., shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the course of their official duties.").
280 See, e.g., TENN. SUP. Cr. R. 31 § 12 ("Activity of Rule 31 Neutrals in the
course of Rule 31 ADR proceedings shall be deemed the performance of a judicial
function and for such acts Rule 31 Neutrals shall be entitled to judicial immunity.").
281 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 44.107 (2003) ("[A] mediator appointed under s.
44.102 shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a
judge.").
282 See, e.g., N.H. SUPER. CT.R. 170(e) ("[E]ach such neutral has immunity from
suit .... ).
283 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 18-B(3) (West 2004) ("A person serving as an ADR provider under contract with the Judicial Department... is immune
from any civil liability ... for acts performed within the scope of the provider's or
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Where less than full immunity is afforded mediators, the full pan-

oply of tort standards (good faith,285 bad faith,286 gross negligence,2 8 7

willful

and

wanton,2 8 8

maliciousness,2 89

or

a

the director's duties."); Wis. STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (2003) ("Mediators ... are immune
from civil liability for any act or omission within the scope of their performance of
their powers and duties under this section.").
are immune from
284 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (2003) ("Mediators ...
civil liability for any act or omission within the scope of their performance of their
powers and duties under this section.").
285 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1440(5) (West 2003) ("A mediator or
arbitrator is immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the
scope of the mediator's or arbitrator's performance of powers and duties under this
section. Every act or omission is presumed to be a good faith act or omission. This
presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence."); S.D. CoDi.
FED LAWS § 54-13-20 (Michie 2003) ("Any person serving as a mediator ... pursuant to this chapter is immune from civil liability in any action brought in any court in
this state on the basis of any act or omission resulting in damage or injury if the
individual was acting in good faith, in a reasonable and prudent manner, and within
the scope of such individual's official functions and duties as a mediator.., pursuant
to this chapter.").
286 See, e.g., DEL. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. 16.1(n) ("All ADR Practitioners, when serving as an arbitrator, mediator or neutral assessor, shall be immune from civil liability
for, or resulting from, any act or omission done or made while engaged in ADR,
unless an act or omission was made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in
a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
another."); FLA. STAT. ch. 44.201(6) (2003) ("No officer, council member, employee,
volunteer, or agent of a Citizen Dispute Settlement Center shall be held liable for
civil damages for any act or omission in the scope of employment or function unless
such person acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another."); IOWA
CODE § 13.16(1) (2003) ("A member of the farm mediation staff, including a mediator... is not liable for civil damages for a statement or decision made in the process
of mediation, unless the member acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a
manner exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or
property.").
287 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-513 (West 2003) ("No neutral person ... of a
government board of an approved program may be held liable for civil damages for
any statement or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless such person acts, or fails to act, in a manner constituting gross negligence with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights, safety or property
of any party to the process of dispute resolution.").
288 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-207 (Michie 2003) ("No impartial third party
administering or participating in a dispute resolution process shall be held liable for
civil damages for any statement or decision made in connection with or arising out
of the conduct of a dispute resolution process unless such person acted in a manner
exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct."); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.055(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person appointed to facilitate an alternative dispute
resolution procedure ... who is a volunteer and who does not act with wanton and
wilful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another, is immune from civil
liability for any act or omission within the course and scope of his or her duties or
functions as an impartial third party.").
289 See, e.g., DEL. Sup. Cr. R. Civ. P. 16.1(n) ("All ADR Practitioners, when serv-
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hodgepodge of standards 29 0 ) are invoked in the various provi-

sions. Whether it is intra-provision, intrastate, or interstate, the
cacophony of voices establishing immunity does not bode well

for the comprehensibility or predictability of this area.
B.

The Irony of the Statutes and Rules

An irony embedded within the vast variety of provisions affording immunity for mediators fatally undermines the foundations of such immunity. Over one hundred thirty years ago the
Supreme Court understood that judges should be afforded absolute immunity, 291 and four hundred years ago the English courts
understood this principle as well.29 2 If the protection afforded
the judiciary had been less than absolute, there would have been

incessant litigation attempting to determine if a judge's conduct
was done in good faith or was reckless, willful or wanton, or any

of the myriad other tort standards. Giving a judge partial immunity is only minutely better than giving him or her no protection
at all.
The failure to align the rule- and statute-based mediator im-

munity with the absolute immunity provided to judges and to the
case law establishing mediator immunity exposes the self-interested and self-serving nature of these provisions. 29 1 Either
mediators are the same as judges, or they are not. Either they

deserve the same protection as judges, or they do not.
Perhaps a quantitative analysis would aid the discussion. In
order to conclude that mediator behavior is sufficiently unlike

judicial behavior and that mediators deserve something less than
absolute protection, two questions must be answered. First, what
ing as an arbitrator, mediator or neutral assessor, shall be immune from civil liability
for, or resulting from, any act or omission done or made while engaged in ADR,
unless an act or omission was made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in
a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
another.").
290 See, e.g., id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-513 (West 2003) ("No neutral person ...
may be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless such person acts, or fails to act, in a manner constituting gross negligence with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful
disregard of the rights, safety or property of any party to the process of dispute
resolution.").
291 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1871); see supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
292 Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1608); see supra text accompanying
notes 16-23.
293 See supra Part II.
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is the degree of similarity (or dissimilarity) between mediators
and judges, and how is that relationship expressed as a percentage or ratio? In other words, do a mediator's duties represent
fifty percent or two-thirds of a judge's duties? Is there an eightypercent similarity? Second, when the first question has been answered, how is the percentage or ratio of similarity applied to the
various tort measures of misconduct? Once the ratio of similarity has been determined, how do you find the appropriate degree
of misconduct that deserves protection? If a mediator's acts represent five-sevenths of a judge's acts, does that mean a mediator
should be immune unless his or her conduct amounts to recklessness? Or, willful and wanton misconduct?
Certainly, such an analysis represents a profound act of folly
and futility. On the first question, it is impossible to extend the
argument beyond the simple observation that a mediator is sufficiently comparable to a judge to deserve absolute immunity or,
as I have argued throughout this paper, he or she is so sufficiently unlike a judge that no protection is warranted. Although
such arguments appear to be based upon logic, they rest principally upon our own perspective. For instance, let us reexamine
the scale metaphor invoked earlier. If an observer stands at a far
distance, mediators look like judges because they both resolve
conflict, but upon closer examination the similarity quickly
dissolves.
For the second question, we must apply the similarity ratio to
standards of tort liability to determine what degree of a mediator's conduct deserves tort protection. Again, this task is impossible. Within this inquiry, one hoary question resides: is it
possible to quantify tort standards of conduct, either separately
or together? Does recklessness represent seventy-five percent of
the distance from non-negligent behavior to intentional behavior? Is maliciousness worse than willful and wanton action? This
is an inquiry to which scholars surrendered many years ago.
Even embarking on such a journey of comparison and analysis is
absurd and would only amount to pure speculation.
It is impossible to justify limited immunity on anything other
than the self-interest of mediators and the courts, combined with
a misperception of the need. This is exacerbated by the fact that
the ADR movement has few natural predators, other than a
small number of scholars who raise such questions. If mediation
can be instrumental in clearing dockets, how could anyone op-
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pose a bit of protection for mediators? Further, I believe that
most ADR statutes are written by those in the profession who
may not want to risk going after absolute immunity for fear of
overreaching. Therefore, any protection is better than none.
The courts certainly don't oppose mediator immunity because
they operate on the misguided perception that without some
form of immunity, mediators will not staff the court-annexed
ADR programs. And, as we shall see in a moment, it provides an
easy method of avoiding the difficult questions of mediator
misconduct.
So, while the question regarding the degree of protection that
should be afforded judges has been settled for centuries, the vast
range of protections written for mediators speaks volumes about
the disarray surrounding the question of mediator immunity. If
mediators are unlike judges, they deserve no protection whatsoever, not some limited form of protection as found in the majority of the provisions described above.
IV
INEQUITABLE

&

MISGUIDED RISK-SHiFTING

Immunity shifts the risk of a poor mediator from the mediator
and the sponsoring institution to the disputants. If a mediator
acts tortiously, the resulting damages will fall squarely on the
shoulders of the injured disputant who has no legal recourse and
who will thus have to "lump" the results.2 9 4 This risk-shifting is
both inequitable and misguided. It is inequitable because the
risk of negligent or intentionally wrongful behavior by the mediator should be borne by those who are best able to shoulder and
appropriately spread the risk. It is misguided because it will interfere with the long-term development of mediation in five
ways, all of which I will develop below.
A.

Inequitable Risk-Shifting

First, let us examine the advantages and disadvantages of
court-annexed mediation from the point of view of the parties.
Obviously, disputants who reach a valid and enduring settlement
receive numerous benefits from a court-annexed program. Parties save time and resources (and those of their associates, part294 For a broader discussion of this term, see William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of
Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 63, 81 (1974).
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ners, employers, employees, fellow workers, family members,
and friends) that would ordinarily be expended for preparation
and trial, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. 2 95 Resources saved

include not only monetary savings, but also the mental and emotional energy that would normally be expended preparing for

and attending any trial. This must be offset against the cost of
the mediation, but it is safe to assume that the tradeoff goes

markedly in favor of the parties.
Then, there are the less tangible benefits, including the ability
of the parties to exercise self-determination,2 9 6 which usually
leads to more enduring agreements.2 9 7 Parties can retain confi-

dentiality over settlement discussions and over any agreement
reached. 298 Also, the parties often craft resolutions that are far
more flexible, creative, and interest-based than the normal reme-

dies available to a trial judge. 299 Finally, and most ephemeral of

all, are the reduction of irrationality 3" and hostility, 30 1 and the
possible repair of damaged relationships.3 °2 Trial, to the con-

trary, contributes to emotional pain and suffering and often renLeonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982);
Schildt et al., supra note 9, at 17 (finding mediation to be faster and cheaper); Joan
B. Kelly, Is Mediation Less Expensive? Comparison of Mediated and Adversarial
Divorce Costs, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 23 (1990) (finding that comprehensive divorce
mediation processes are "considerably less expensive ... than the two-attorney adversarial process"); GEORGE C. FAIRBANKS, IV & IRIS C. STREET, "TIMING IS EVERYTHING" THE APPROPRIATE TIMING OF CASE REFERRALS TO MEDIATION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF Two COURTS 23-24 (2001) (finding that early intervention
with mediation led to higher rates of settlement and much lower rate of cases being
adjudicated); GOERDT, supra note 9, at 104 (finding small claims mediation programs "to be very cost-effective"); Slack, supra note 9, at 31 (perceiving, by attorneys, that mediation shortened case lifespan in 80% of cases and reduced costs to
their clients in 70%). But see SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET AL., MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT
OF DIVORCE MEDIATION AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSING 51 (1992) (finding
no clear picture that mediation programs reduce parties' costs).
2 96
JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (1984); JAY FOLBERG & ANN
MILNE, DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (1988); RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 146, at 34.
297 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 296.
2 98
See generally KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICE 52-53 (2d ed. 2000); FOLBERO & MILNE, supra note 296, at 9.
299 KOVACH, supra note 298, at 52-53; RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 146, at
34.
300
D. Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future Directions,
20 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 1, 14 (1982).
301 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 296, at 10; FOLBERG & MILNE, supra note
296, at 9.
302 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 168, at 180; KOVACH, supra note 298, at 52.
295
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ders relationships beyond repair. 30 3 In court-annexed programs,
parties that settle receive the full panoply of blessings that have
been touted since the modern rebirth of mediation almost three
decades ago.3°4
For parties that do not settle during mediation, the picture is
not entirely bleak. Although disputants incur the cost and time
expenditures involved with the mediation, as well as all of the
costs associated with trial,30 5 parties often reduce the number
and complexity of outstanding issues. Mediation can also reduce
the overall levels of hostility between the parties and/or their
counsel, thus saving time by reducing the number and length of
acrimonious hearings and making discovery more efficient.30 6

However, the disputants are not the only ones to gain from a
successful mediation; the courts win, as well. Although some
may like to attribute altruistic motives to the courts, they are
charged with resolving conflicts and must make do with the resources they are allocated by the legislature. This means clearing
the docket in the most expeditious manner possible. To many in
the judiciary, mediation may seem to be a black box,3 07 into

which disputes and disputants are thrust and out of which comes
settlement agreements and happy disputants. The courts may
care little and understand less of what goes on inside this black
box, so long as the mediators deliver settlements and satisfied
customers. Each settlement means one less case on the docket;
each successful program means reduced caseloads for the entire
trial bench.
Unfortunately, the data are inconclusive on the question of
savings to the courts of time and money.30 8 Even so, the percep30 3

FOLBERG & TAYLOR,

supra note 296, at 10-11.

304 KOVACH, supra note 298, at 28-30; see also CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
DisPuTE PROCESSES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL 272-75 (forthcoming 2004) (discussing several parallel roots of mediation all
developing in the latter part of the 20th century).
305 FAIRBANKS & STREET, supra note 295, at 23-24 (finding that the lack of settle-

ment can have a "significant monetary impact").
30 6
FOLBERG & MILNE, supra note 296, at 7.
307 A "black box" is generally an "electronic device with known performance
characteristics but unknown constituents and means of operation." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 90 (3d ed. 1994). See generally Local 808, Bldg. Maint.,
Serv., and R.R. Workers v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 888 F.2d 1428, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding the need for a "black box" relates to the "special role of the mediator and
the unusual dynamics of the mediation process"); Brown, supra note 5, at 310.
308 CLARKE ET AL., supra note 9, at 37 (1995) (reporting that a program of courtordered "mediation settlement conferences" did not seem to "have reduced the
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tion of savings is certainly prominent. 30 9 However, parties report
increased procedural and substantive satisfaction.3 10 Most disputants feel that they have been heard while exercising self-determination and resolving differences. They frequently leave with
increased satisfaction for the entire process. Such effects redound to the benefit of the courts as the sponsors of the mediation programs. So, in the aggregate, courts benefit greatly from
court-annexed programs.
So, when parties settle with the help of a qualified and competent mediator, everyone gains, the parties and the courts. The
disputants go home with an agreement that comes closer to
meeting their joint needs than would a court resolution and they
have accomplished this with much less financial and psychological cost. The courts benefit because a case has been eliminated
from the docket. Further, the court is the indirect recipient of
the procedural and substantive satisfaction felt by the parties.
Even when the parties are unable to settle, the level of conflict is
often reduced to a more manageable level and some, if not all, of
the issues may have been resolved or simplified. Even without a
settlement, the parties can feel better about the entire process.
Everyone gains from a court-annexed mediation program, it
seems, except for the parties forced into a settlement tainted by
mediator misconduct. Although parties, as a class, are benefited
by court-annexed mediation, this benefit is spread unevenly
across the class with most receiving great benefit and a small
number receiving a detriment, sometimes not insignificant, because of mediator negligence or intentional misconduct. Parties
enter mediation in an attempt to avoid cumbersome and costly
courts' workload in terms of trials, motions, or orders"); GOERDT, supra note 9, at
104-05 (hypothesizing considerable savings of judicial time in small claims courts
based upon mediation programs that rely heavily on volunteer mediators and where
costs are minimal or borne by other parties); Pamela A. Eavenson, Mandatory Divorce Mediation: The Impact on the Courts 22 (May 1998) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the National Center for State Courts) (showing mixed results on time-todisposition of divorce cases involved in mediation); cf Susan L. Keilitz, et al., MultiState Assessment of Divorce Mediation and Traditional Court Processing 51 (September 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the National Center for State
Courts) ("[W]hether mediation reduces costs to the parties remains an open question."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES wITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (1997) (reporting
decreased costs for employer utilization of mediation programs involving EEOC
conflicts).
309 Slack, supra note 9, at iv.
310 GOERDT, supra note 9, at 104; Slack, supra note 9, at 10.
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trials, but if disputants are not allowed to recover for a mediator's wrongful act, then they have essentially lost the benefit of
any mediation agreement. As a result, courts with mediator immunity benefit from reduced dockets and increased rates of satisfaction while shifting all of the risk of mediator misconduct to a
few unsuspecting and unprepared disputants.
The courts, however, are better situated than individual disputants to withstand the costs and to spread the risk of mediator
misconduct. Three reasons support this conclusion. First, when
compared with the courts, disputants are poorly situated to
shoulder costs imposed by mediator misconduct. The general inability to shoulder this risk is especially true for court-annexed
programs aimed at smaller cases and ones in which the parties
frequently appear pro se or where they cannot afford to bring
counsel to mediation. Even if individual litigants could afford
the cost of mediator misconduct, the imposition of such costs
cannot be justified in light of the relative ease with which the
courts could insure mediators in court-annexed programs by
purchasing a separate policy to cover the mediators or placing
the risk in the statewide risk management system. Courts could
then absorb the cost or spread it over all mediations with an administrative fee or add-on. Or, they could spread the costs over
all civil case filings by asking the legislatures to increase the civil
filing fee accordingly. If the court-annexed program relies upon
fee-paid mediators, the cost could be covered by a surcharge on
the mediators' fees. Or, as has been done by a few counties in
Ohio, the court can require that mediators maintain liability
insurance.3 1 1
Second, even if parties wanted to, they cannot spread the risk
of mediator misconduct across the class of all disputants. Unlike
the courts, parties as a class have no risk-spreading mechanism,
akin to uninsured motorist coverage, to insure against mediator
misconduct. Every prudent driver carries an uninsured motorist
provision on her insurance policy to provide coverage in case she
is involved in an accident where the negligent driver has no liability insurance. The uninsured driver provision is activated and
provides insurance in place of the other driver's non-existent lia311 See OHIO CUYAHOGA COUNTY C.P. DOM. REL. R. 32(E)(4) ("Mediators shall
have the following minimum qualifications: ....
(4) Maintenance of appropriate

liability insurance specifically covering the activities of the individual as a mediator."); OHIO FRANKLIN CouNrTY C.P. DOM. REL. R. 22(5); Ohio Ct. Order 22, LuCAS DOM. REL. R. 18.04(D).
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bility coverage. However, drivers purchase coverage that protects them over the entire term of the policy and the hundreds of
times they drive; they do not buy a separate uninsured driver
provision every time they jump into their car. Similarly, parties
cannot purchase insurance to protect themselves from a negligent mediator on a single-case basis.
And, finally, even if such insurance were available, we cannot
assume that parties to mediation are efficient economic actors
and would understand the risks involved. As a result, parties
would not bargain for such protection in face of the admittedly
microscopic risk. This is true for both the small pro se case and
the large counsel-guided case. In the pro se case, it is safe to
assume that most parties have little or no understanding of mediation, let alone the potential risks involved and the need to protect against them. In the larger cases where the parties are more
likely to pick their own mediator, it is hard to imagine an attorney advising a client, on the one hand, that they chose an excellent mediator and, on the other, telling the client they need to
purchase insurance prior to mediation.
Further, work in the psychology of bounded rationality implies
that parties may not purchase insurance to protect against a negligent mediator, even if they were fully advised of the risks involved.3 12 Most people will think negatively of paying money
now for future protection against the unlikely chance that the
mediator will act wrongfully. When faced with the choice of paying money now for the insurance or saving the insurance premium and hoping that the mediator will not misbehave, most will
become risk-seeking and choose to go unprotected. In other
words, they will save the premium and assume the risk of mediator misconduct and hope that it will not happen.3 13 As a result,

most disputants will not have any protection against mediator
misbehavior.
In summary, immunity for mediators is inequitable for several
reasons. First, disputants are much less able to shoulder the burden of malpractice. Second, they cannot (or probably will not)
protect themselves against wrongful conduct. And finally, courts
312 Daniel Kahneman, A Perspectiveon the Judgment of Choice, 58 AM. PSYCHOL.
697 (2003).
313 MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 35
(1992); Scott H. Hughes, The Simple Rules: Gain or Loss-How Do PartiesSee Potential Settlements?, 1 NEWSLETTER OF THE AM. ACAD. OF ADR ATr'Ys 6 (2003).
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are better situated to shoulder or spread the risk. This is not a
question of whom should be sacrificed when misconduct occurs
nor is it a question of deciding who should carry this risk between
two equally situated parties. A few unsuspecting disputants
should not be forced to incur the costs associated with poor mediator behavior, especially when the alternatives are considered.
B.

Misguided Risk-Shifting

Risk-shifting is misguided for five reasons. First, it may make
disputants more reluctant to engage in mediation. Second, it
may increase the risk that the legislatures and the courts will begin to regulate the field or greatly increase the current level of
regulation of mediators. Third, it reduces the deterrent effect
that potential tort liability may have on misbehavior. Fourth, it
prevents the marketplace from helping to correct errant behavior
or weed out bad mediators. And, fifth, mediator immunity prevents the development of the common law and the attendant
standards of conduct for mediators.314
First, mediator immunity may chill parties' willingness to mediate. I think it is safe to assume that parties to mediation are
overwhelmingly ignorant of the existence of immunity provisions
that protect mediators, let alone understand the ramifications of
such protections. As to the knowledge of the general public
about mediator immunity, I can only extrapolate from my inquiries within the mediator community in my home state of New
Mexico. Having been told that New Mexico had a provision for
mediator immunity, I sent my research assistants to the books to
search for the rule. Finding none, I began to ask my fellow practitioners. The overwhelming response was a palms-up gesture
and a questioning look. A minority felt we had some provision,
but only one or two were fairly certain. With some knowledgeable guidance, we eventually found the provision for full immunity
buried in the local rules for the Second Judicial District for the
314 Cf. Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All Wrong:
Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings
Should Be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 135, 162 (2003):
As super contracts, mediated agreements in strict mediation confidentiality
jurisdictions are effectively exempt from the established standards for the
enforcement of agreements: contract common law. These standards
evolved over centuries to protect parties from abuses or injustices in the
enforcement of agreements. Strict mediation confidentiality essentially deprives mediation participants of many of the protections embodied in contract law principles.
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court-annexed ADR program.3 1 5 It is the only provision in New
Mexico. If the professionals in the community are not well
versed about immunity, certainly the general public is even more
ignorant.
Next, mediators who are aware of mediator immunity do not
educate parties in mediation. Although many states have immunity for mediators in one form or another, I would guess that no
mediator has ever added this line to his or her opening monologue: "And, if I am negligent during this mediation and do
something that might give rise to a claim for misconduct, the law
prohibits you from suing me to recover your damages." Or even
a simple: "If something goes wrong in this mediation, you have
no cause of action against me." I am aware of no disclaimer of
liability in agreements to mediate. Mediator immunity may be
one of the best-kept secrets within the profession.
It seems for the most part that we have been able to hide mediator immunity from disputants. Other than the few reported
cases discussed earlier,3 x6 there appear to be no cases dealing
with immunity. There may have been instances where parties
have sought to make a claim against a mediator, but who have
been dissuaded by astute counsel who has stuck his or her nose
into the books before filing suit. In any case, if parties generally
become aware that mediators are immune and that the risk of a
bad mediator falls completely upon them, I believe there is a substantial chance that some parties may be reluctant to mediate.
This development would not be good for the profession.
If I am accused of hysteria, it is certainly no different from the
hysteria of immunity proponents when they argue that court-annexed programs will have no mediators without the protection of
mediator immunity. Such a conclusion rests upon pure conjecture; no data exists to show that court-annexed programs thrive
where immunity exists and do not thrive in the absence of this
protection. Only eighteen states have broad-based or court-annexed programs with immunity provisions, and many other programs cover only extremely narrow areas of practice. If the
argument for immunity were true, then those court-annexed programs without such protection would not survive and those with
immunity provisons would prosper. This does not seem to be the
case. In New Mexico, we have a thriving mediation community
315 N.M. 2D J. DISr. R. LR2-601(E).
316 See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
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and court-annexed programs exist under both sets of conditions.
California has a very large mediation community and many mature mediation programs, even though the only immunity provision in California can be found in a mediation program for
attorney fee disputes.3" 7

Second, continued or expanded mediator immunity may increase the risk of regulation of the profession to a level greatly in
excess of what currently exists. If immunity laws foil disputants
from obtaining relief from mediator misconduct, they may well
turn their efforts to the legislature and press for regulation. If
they cannot file a lawsuit to recover for their losses, their human
need for vindication and retribution may be transformed into a
need to prevent others from suffering a similar fate. It would
only take one or two "poster child" cases of mediator coercion or
intimidation to move the legislature in this direction, especially
with a profession that is so lightly regulated currently. The problem would be further exacerbated if a case arose in a jurisdiction
with no administrative process to discipline or sanction mediators
3 18
who misbehave.
No states currently license mediators and only a few have significant statewide certification programs; states do little or no
regulating of the profession. Most mediators complete training
programs of thirty-two or forty hours before beginning to mediate, but this is more of a community norm than a requirement.
In most states, it is possible to hang out a shingle and start mediating without any formal training.
Mediation benefits from a diverse community where access is
relatively simple and inexpensive. Most practitioners seek an atmosphere of inclusiveness where individuals from many profes317 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(f) (West 2003).

318 Of the slight majority of states that have some immunity provision, only six
have disciplinary processes. See Fla. 15th J. Cir., Palm Beach Cty., Admin. Order
No. 3.015-6/01 (creating a Mediator Grievance Review Committee that reviews written complaints about mediators and conducts fact-gathering proceedings to recommend appropriate action); GA. ADR R. App. C (creating process to review
complaints that may result in sanctions, including additional training, restriction of
types of cases to be mediated in the future, continuing education, mentoring by an
experienced mediator/mentor, suspension for specified term, or removal from registration); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:7 (West 2003) (creating disciplinary process
for certified marital mediators where discipline may include a written warning and
temporary or permanent suspension); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.2 (2004); OKLA.

STAT. tit. 12, § 1837 (2004) (creating a decertification process for mediators); S.C.
CIR. CT. ADR R. 12 (providing for any sanction the Supreme Court deems appropriate for violation of the rules or ethical standards).
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sions and with varied skill-sets are encouraged to become
mediators to infuse the practice with new methodologies and to
enrich the continuing dialogue about the future course of the
profession. Regulation will greatly dampen this effect, as it tends
to be exclusionary and anticompetitive. It is the nature of the
regulative process to create qualifications of training or education for entry,3 1 9 to quantify the qualities of the profession so
that tests can be designed and administered, 320 and to require
certain conduct for continued membership in the profession,
such as compliance with standards of conduct and continuing education.321 Unless the qualifications reflect current norms for
training, any regulation will only limit who enters and increase
the price to those who seek to enter. More than likely, the burden for entry would increase dramatically. It is possible that regulation could limit entry to members of several professions that
require years of education and qualifying exams, such as attorneys, counselors, and psychologists. Regulation along these lines
would prohibit many qualified individuals from mediating and
substantially increase the cost of entry for those who do seek the
appropriate degrees to qualify.
Further, considering the attitude of legislators these days toward any new taxes, a significant portion of the cost of any additional bureaucracy may end up resting upon the shoulders of
individual mediators through certification fees or taxes. The additional costs required to maintain this bureaucracy, when added
to the costs of qualifying, will further raise the cost of entry to the
profession, resulting in the possible exclusion of many talented
potential mediators.
Regulation would have two impacts on the profession, one
more direct and immediate and the other less direct, but possibly
more injurious to our field. First, if large areas of practice are
limited to certain professionals, the underlying nature of mediation would change substantially. For instance, if only attorneys
are allowed to mediate,322 the model could become more nar319 Robert Kry, The "Watchman For Truth": ProfessionalLicensing And The First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2000).
320 See id.
321

Id.

322 For a general discussion of the turf battles arising between attorneys and
others through the use of statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, see
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Pro-
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rowly focused and evaluative.32 3 Certainly, this trend is not de-

sirable. Second, regulation could severely injure what little
diversity currently exists in the field by discouraging members of
groups who have been traditionally underrepresented, such as ra-

cial and ethic minorities, individuals with disabilities, and gays
and lesbians. If diversity declines (or fails to improve), the quality and richness of the dialogue within the field will also suffer.
Without the cacophony of voices that this field now encourages,
we will all be the worse.
The trend toward regulation is completely anathema to most in
the field who desire to remain inclusionary, to keep the costs

down for entry into the field, and to avoid the need for governmental regulation. While immunity will not be the cause of regulation, I think immunity will contribute to the push for the
regulation of our field. All in all, regulation is not a trend worth

encouraging and mediator immunity may be one irritant that encourages such a trend.

Third, mediator immunity is misguided because it removes any
3 24

deterrent that exists because of the potential for tort liability.

Although this impact might be minimal for most mediators, a
case can be made along two lines of reasoning. If a mediator
becomes overly concerned with his or her track record and the
percentage of cases settled, it may be only one small step from

encouraging settlement to coercion. As in the case of the Misbefessional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
235, 258 (2002).
323 Cf. Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1 (2002); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out. Is This the
End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66 (1991).

324 For a general discussion of the deterrent effect of tort liability, see Beatrice A.
Beltran, Note, Posner and Tort Law as Insurance, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 187-88
(2000-01).
Much of the criticism regarding tort law's ineffectiveness as a deterrence
mechanism is also based on the unreasonable requirement that tort law
provide an absolute level of deterrence. The critics would do well to view
tort law as providing a significant level, though not an absolute level, of
deterrence. The two competing levels of deterrence involve: the "strong"
form of the deterrence argument-which assumes that tort law does in fact
deter as thoroughly as economic models suggest-and the more "moderate" form of the argument-which assumes that tort law provides a significant amount of deterrence, yet considerably less than the economists'
formulae tend to predict.
Id. See also Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and CorrectiveJustice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
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having Mediator and the Pasty Participant, the allegations
against the mediator may have arisen from a pressure to settle as
many cases as possible. It may have arisen from a need to settle
the "big one." This pressure can be exacerbated in cases where
mediators can work with contingent fees or incentives if the case
settles. The lack of the disincentive for errant behavior provided
by tort liability will exacerbate the shifting of risk to the innocent
and unprotected disputant.
Further, the deterrent effect of tort liability may encourage the
merely negligent mediator to continue his or her education and
professional improvement to decrease the likelihood of malpractice and to avoid any future problems. Like the Negligent Neutral we met at the beginning, tort liability for negligence may well
provide the incentive to sharpen his or her mediation skills. It
may aid his or her understanding of the line between legal information, which the mediator gave in the beginning, and legal advice, which arguably the mediator provided near the end of the
mediation by allowing the parties to proceed without consulting
their attorneys. Without the deterrence tort liability provides,
some mediators may brush off the need and expense of continued learning and improvement. It may well be those marginal
mediators who most need the help and guidance that continuing
education provides.
Fourth, although there is a nascent market for mediator services and only a small percentage of mediators rely on a full-time
income from mediation fees, the market can have a beneficial
impact on our profession. The potential for liability may push
many mediators to purchase malpractice insurance, thus spreading the risk of misconduct among all mediators. Further, the insurance companies can loss-rate the mediators and raise the rates
for poor mediators or deny them coverage. Further, uninsured
mediators who misbehave may be pushed out of the profession.
This would not be an unfortunate circumstance.
This principle can extend to court-annexed mediation programs. If the courts or the state purchase insurance to cover the
pool of mediators, the addition of an extra set of eyes from the
insurance company that monitors the errors and omissions policy
will aid the administrators of the court-annexed program to weed
out misbehaving or underperforming mediators. This marketdriven process may well work better than a disciplinary process.
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It will also reimburse disputants damaged by mediator misbehavior, something that a complaint department could never do.
Mediator immunity will impede the usefulness of the markets
because mediators will have no inclination to purchase malpractice insurance. Instead of waiting for the legislatures to regulate
on a large scale, the markets, through malpractice insurance, can
help to weed out bad mediators while providing a system that
can provide adequate compensation for parties who unfortunately draw a negligent mediator.
Finally, mediator immunity prevents the common law from
aiding in the development of adequate and detailed standards of
conduct for mediators. If mediators are immune from suit for
their misconduct, the common law cannot help to delineate the
line separating acceptable from wrongful behavior. Courts provide a slow but persistent method to address the evolution of mediation on a case-by-case basis, allowing for a much lengthier and
informed discussion on what constitutes good mediation and,
conversely, what constitutes bad mediation.
The argument is much broader than it may seem at first blush.
The profession can hardly agree on what mediation is, let alone
what is good mediation and what is bad mediation. We cannot
agree about what it takes to be a good mediator or how we properly train individuals to be good mediators. When faced with a
few bad cases, is it appropriate as a profession to turn these
large-scale decisions over to the legislatures to rebound back
with poorly-written regulations? Are we ready to open up these
sticky questions to such a broad-based inquiry? When considering issues of mediator qualifications and regulation (which is the
only way that legislators can make these distinctions), legislators
will be making decisions, about what is good mediation, what is
bad mediation, and what it takes to be a good mediator.
For these five reasons, mediator immunity is misguided. It
may increase the reluctance of people to engage in mediation. If
there are "poster child" cases where immunity provisions prohibit recovery from mediator misconduct, pressure for regulation
may increase. Immunity will remove the deterrent effect arising
from potential tort liability, thus increasing the potential for
wrongful conduct and the resulting pressure for regulation. Finally, mediator immunity prevents the markets through insurance and the courts through the common law from helping to
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define the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable
practice.
CONCLUSION

Although the history of judicial immunity is somewhat troublesome and disconcerting, it is a model of clarity and consistency
when compared to the recent developments in mediator immunity. In order for the courts to justify mediator immunity in Wagshal v. Foster and Howard v. Drapkin, it was necessary to either

misconstrue the fundamental differences between judges and
mediators or ignore the standard tests applied to judicial immunity and jump to a needs-based argument that is clearly self-interested and poorly informed. With regards to statutes and rules,
those that promulgate immunity have ignored the substantial
problems that will eventually arise from mediator immunity, such
as a risk of regulation, reluctance on the part of disputants to
mediate, and the deleterious impact on the development of the
practice by way of the common law. Although arguments have
been advanced that immunity is necessary to insure a supply of
mediators for court-annexed programs, there appears to be no
empirical support for this position. Nor is there any anecdotal
support either; court-annexed programs are flourishing where no
immunity exists. In the final measure, there is nothing to support
immunity for mediators other then the naked self-interest of the
courts and mediators.
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APPENDIX:
STATE TREATMENT OF MEDIATOR IMMUNITY

Format of Appendix

STATE NAME
CASE LAW, STATUTE, or RULE: (citation to case, statute or
rule)
Category: (type of mediation covered, w/ brief description)
Degree of Immunity: (full, limited, or none, with pertinent terms)
Language: (statutory or rule language)
Comment: (details of particular note)
ALABAMA
None
ALASKA
STATUTE: ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.450(h) (Michie 2003).
Category: Specialized program for victim-offender mediation for
delinquent minors by community dispute resolution centers.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity for duties "within the official
capacity of the individual."
Language: "An individual who is a member or an agent of the
board of directors or a mediator at a community dispute resolution center is immune from suit in a civil action based
upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or a discretionary
duty within the official capacity of the individual. A community dispute resolution center is immune from suit in a
civil action based upon an act or failure to act for which an
individual is granted immunity under this subsection."
Comment: The commissioner of health and social services may
recognize a community mediation service as a community
dispute resolution center to provide mediation services after
meeting certain detailed standards and procedures
(§ 47.12.450(b)), but the term "community dispute resolution center" is not otherwise defined in the statutes.
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. D. ALASKA R. Civ. 16.2(h)(1).
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the District of Alaska.
Degree of Immunity: Full; court rule awards quasi-judicial
immunity.
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Language: "Any private person serving as a neutral under this
rule is deemed to be performing a quasi-judicial function
and is entitled to the immunities and protections that the law
accords to persons serving in that capacity."
ARIZONA
STATUTE: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(E) (West 2003).
Category: General statute found in the evidence chapter of the
state's laws.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Does not extend to "intentional
misconduct or reckless disregard."
Language: "A mediator is not subject to civil liability except for
those acts or omissions that involve intentional misconduct
or reckless disregard of a substantial risk of a significant injury to the rights of others."
Comment: Immunity for mediators for this general civil program
is limited, but immunity provisions for appellate mediation
and for attorney discipline are absolute. See below.
COURT RULE: ARIZ. R. Civ. App. P. 30(o).
Category: Specialized appellate mediation program.
Degree of Immunity: Absolute immunity.
Language: "Appellate mediators, the settlement conference attorney and all other court employees involved in the Program shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in
the course of their official duties."
Comment: Immunity provisions in Arizona are inconsistent. See
note above under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(E).
COURT RULE: ARIZ. Sup. CT. R. 48(1).
Category: Specialized program for the mediation of disputes involved with admission and discipline of attorneys.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity.
Language: "Members of the board, commission, hearing committees or hearing officers, mediators, the peer review committee, the ethics committee, monitors of the Membership
Assistance or Law Office Management Assistance Programs, probable cause panelists, bar counsel and staff shall
be immune from suit for any conduct in the course of their
official duties."
Comment: Immunity provisions in Arizona are inconsistent. See
note above under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(E).
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ARKANSAS

STATUTE:

§ 16-7-207 (Michie 2003).
Category: General.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to willful or wanton misconduct.
Language: "No impartial third party administering or participating in a dispute resolution process shall be held liable for
civil damages for any statement or decision made in connection with or arising out of the conduct of a dispute resolution
process unless such person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct."
Comment: Immunity is extended to impartial third parties, not
just mediators.
ARK. CODE ANN.

CALIFORNIA
CASE LAW: Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App.
1990); Goad v. Erwin, 2003 WL 22753608 (Ct. App. 2003).
Comment: See supra part II.A.

STATUTE:

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(f) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of attorney fee
disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity. Immunity shall be the same
as that "which attaches in judicial proceedings."
Language: "In any arbitration or mediation conducted pursuant
to this article by the State Bar or by a local bar association,
pursuant to rules of procedure approved by the board of
governors, an arbitrator or mediator, as well as the arbitrating association and its directors, officers, and employees,
shall have the same immunity which attaches in judicial
proceedings."
Comment: Under this article, participation in arbitration shall be
voluntary for the client but mandatory for the attorney if
arbitration is commenced by the client (§ 6200(c)).

LOCAL RULE: U.S.

DIST. CT.

E.D.

CAL.

R. Civ. § 16-271(f).

Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the Eastern District of California.
Degree of Immunity: Full.
Language: "All persons serving as Neutrals under this Local
Rule are deemed to be performing quasi-judicial functions
and shall be immune to the extent provided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 655(c) and applicable authorities."
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Comments: 28 U.S.C. § 655(c) provides for quasi-judicial immunity for arbitrators.
COLORADO
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-305(6) (West 2003).
Category: General program, under the state Dispute Resolution
Act, whether or not an action has been filed.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to willful or wanton misconduct.
Language: "The liability of mediators shall be limited to willful
or wanton misconduct."
STATUTE: CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-507 (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for resolution of disputes under
the Colorado International Dispute Resolution Act.
Degree of Immunity: Uncertain. Does not immunize mediators
from civil liability, but exempts mediators from service of
process while participating in international dispute resolutions in Colorado.
Language: "None of the arbitrators, mediatoRs, conciliators, witnesses, parties, or representatives of the parties involved in
the arbitration, mediation, or conciliation of an international
dispute pursuant to this part 5 shall be subject to service of
process on any civil matter while such persons are present in
this state for the purpose of participating in the arbitration,
mediation, or conciliation of that international dispute."
Comment: This statute does not appear to limit liability of
mediators for negligence or misconduct, but to facilitate individuals coming to Colorado for purposes of resolving international disputes. However, industrious defense counsel
should consider pleading it in the face of a later claim of
misconduct. Because this statute does not directly create
mediator immunity, it has not been counted in the totals
stated in the main text.

STATUTE: COLO.

COURT RULE: COLO. R. Civ. P. 251.32(e).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of attorney discipline matters.
Degree of Immunity: Full for conduct in the course of official
duties.
Language: "Persons performing official duties under the provisions of this Chapter, including but not limited to . . .
mediators appointed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
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C.R.C.P. 251.3(c)(11) .. .shall be immune from suit for all
conduct in the course of their official duties."
CONNECTICUT
None
DELAWARE

STATUTE:

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9505(b) (2001).
Category: Specialized program for victim-offender mediation.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to willful or wanton misconduct.
Language: "State employees and employees and volunteers of a
victim-offender mediation program are immune from suit in
any civil action based on any proceedings or other official
act performed in their capacity as employees or volunteers,
except in cases of willful or wanton misconduct."
Comment: The victim-offender mediation program, as an entity,
is also immune from civil liability, except in cases of willful
or wanton misconduct by employees or volunteers or in
cases where board members act in bad faith (§9505(c)).
COURT RULE: DEL. SuP. CT. R. Civ. P. 16.1(n).
Category: General superior court rules (with minor, detailed exceptions) for civil actions subject to Alternative Dispute
Resolution.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
that are in bad faith, with malicious intent, or that exhibit a
willful or wanton disregard of parties' rights, safety, or
property.
Language: "All ADR Practitioners, when serving as an arbitrator, mediator or neutral assessor, shall be immune from civil
liability for, or resulting from, any act or omission done or
made while engaged in ADR, unless an act or omission was
made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in a
manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights,
safety, or property of another."

COURT RULE:

DEL. CH. CT. R. 95(c).'
Category: Specialized program for private mediation of business
and technology disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to
those acts done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or that
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exhibit a willful or wanton disregard of parties' rights, safety,
or property.
Language: "Mediators shall be immune from civil liability for or
resulting from any act or omission done or made in connection with efforts to assist or facilitate a mediation, unless the
act or omission was made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another."
COURT RULE: DEL. CH. CT. R. 174.
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving judicial and attorney ethics.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to
those acts done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or that
exhibit a willful, wanton disregard of parties' rights, safety,
or property.
Language: "Designated mediators shall be immune from civil liability for or resulting from any act or omission done or made
while engaged in efforts to assist or facilitate a mediation,
unless the act or omission was made or done in bad faith,
with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a willful,
wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
another."
COURT RULE: DEL. CT. COM. PL. Civ. R. 16.1(n).
Category: Specialized program for mandatory court-annexed
ADR of disputes in Superior Court for actions of less than
$15,000.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to
those acts done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or that
exhibit a willful or wanton disregard of parties' rights, safety,
or property.
Language: "All ADR Practitioners, when serving as an arbitrator, mediator or neutral assessor, shall be immune from civil
liability for, or resulting from, any act or omission done or
made while engaged in ADR, unless an act or omission was
made or done in bad faith with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights,
safety, or property of another."
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CASE LAW: Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Comment: For a full discussion of this case, see supra Part II.B.
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LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. D.D.C. Civ. R. § 84.3(c).
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the District of Columbia.
Degree of Immunity: Full for lawyers serving as mediators.
Language: "All lawyers serving as mediators in the Court's Mediation Program are performing quasi-judicial functions and
shall be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for acts
performed within the scope of their official duties."
FLORIDA

STATUTE: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.107(1) (West 2004).
Category: General program for court-ordered mediation (with
limited exceptions) (see § 44.102(2)(a) for listing of
exceptions).
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a
judge."
Language: "Arbitrators serving under § 44.103 or § 44.104,
mediators serving under § 44.102, and trainees... shall have
judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge."

STATUTE: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(6) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program authorizing the establishment of
Citizen Dispute Settlement Centers within the state's judicial districts.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity of participants of a Citizen Dispute Settlement Center is not extended to acts that
are in bad faith, have a malicious purpose, or exhibit a willful or wanton disregard of parties, even though the act or
omission occurs in the scope of employment.
Language: "No officer, council member, employee, volunteer, or
agent of a Citizen Dispute Settlement Center shall be held
liable for civil damages for any act or omission in the scope
of employment or function, unless such person acted in bad
faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another."
Comment: This section governs the operation of Citizen Dispute
Settlement Centers and is not necessarily a mediation statute. The degree of protection for employees and volunteers
is limited and does not match the absolute immunity granted
mediators in § 44.107(1).
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§ 627.7015 (5) (West 2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputed property insurance claims.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity as referenced in § 44.107,
above.
Language: "Mediators are deemed to be agents of the department and shall have the immunity from suit provided in
§ 44.107."
Comments: Florida has several specialized mediation programs,
some of which provide for full immunity and others that
limit immunity.

STATUTE:

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 723.038 (9) (West 2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of mobile home
park lot tenancies.
Degree of Immunity: Full, to the same extent as a judge.
Language: "A mediator appointed pursuant to this section shall
have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same
extent as a judge."
Comments: Florida has several specialized mediation programs,
some of which provide for full immunity and others that
limit immunity.

STATUTE:

FLA. STAT. ANN.

COURT RULE:

FLA. BAR

R. 14-7.1

Category: Specialized program for mediation for disputes involving attorney grievances.
Degree of Immunity: Full, "for all acts in the course of their official duties."
Language: "The members of the standing committee, mediators,
arbitrators, staff of the Florida Bar, and appointed voluntary
counsel assisting the committee, mediators, and arbitrators,
shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts
in the course of their official duties."
Comments: Florida has several specialized mediation programs,
some of which provide for full immunity and others that
limit immunity.
LOCAL RULE: Fla. 9th J. Cir. Admin. Order 2001-34.
Category: Specialized program for mediation of all small claims
cases in Orange County.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity as referenced in § 44.107,
above.
Language: "Dispute Resolution Services shall appoint any
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mediators certified in the area of County Civil Mediation by
the Florida Supreme Court. Pursuant to section
4 4 .102(5)(a),
Florida Statutes, mediators serve as volunteers
in Orange County for all County Civil Cases. These
mediators shall have judicial immunity in the same manner
and to the same extent as a judge as provided in section
44.107, Florida Statutes."
GEORGIA
COURT RULE: GA. ADR R. VII(C).
Category: General program for court-annexed or court-referred
mediation.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
that are grossly negligent and made with malice or in willful
disregard of the safety or property of any party.
Language: "No neutral in a court-annexed or court-referred program shall be held liable for civil damages for any statement,
action, omission or decision made in the course of any ADR
process unless that statement, action, omission or decision is
1) grossly negligent and made with malice or 2) is in willful
disregard of the safety or property of any party to the ADR
process."
Comment: Mediator immunity in local courts is governed by the
State Rule.
HAWAII

COURT RULE: HAw. App.

CONF. PROG.

R. 9.

Category: Specialized program for meditation of civil appeals.
Degree of Immunity: Absolute immunity for conduct in the
course of official duties.
Language: "Mediators selected in accordance with Rule 5 of
these Appellate Conference Program Rules shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the course of their
official duties."
Comment: Mediators are selected from a "rotating list" or by
joint selection of the parties (HAW. App. CONF. PROG. R. 5).
The mediator's role and authority are to "(1) facilitate the
voluntary resolution of cases; (2) assist the parties in simplifying, clarifying, and, when possible, reducing the issues
raised on appeal; and (3) extend deadlines such as the deadline for ordering transcripts or filing of briefs and the record
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on appeal, when appropriate." (HAW. APP.
6(a)).

CONF.

PROG. R.

COURT RULE: HAW. PROB. R. Ex. A. MEDIATION R. 9.
Category: Specialized program for meditation of disputes involving probate.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity.
Language: "Mediators selected by the parties or assigned by the
court pursuant to Rule 4 of these Mediation Rules shall be
absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the course of
their official duties."
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. D. HAW. R. 88.1 (j).
Category: Specialized program of the U.S. District Court for voluntary mediation of disputes in district court.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity.
Language: "All persons serving as mediators under this rule shall
be deemed to be performing quasi-judicial functions and
shall be entitled to all of the privileges, immunities, and protections that the applicable law accords to persons serving in
such capacity."
LOCAL RULE: U.S. BANKR. CT. D. HAW. R. 9019-2 (d).
Category: Specialized program of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
voluntary mediation of adversary proceedings and contested
matters in bankruptcy court.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity.
Language: "All persons serving as mediators under this rule shall
be deemed to be performing quasi-judicial functions and
shall be entitled to all of the privileges, immunities, and protections that the applicable law accords to persons serving in
such capacity."
IDAHO
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. D. IDAHO Civ. R. 16.5 (g).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes in
Bankruptcy Court.
Degree of Immunity: None. A provision granting immunity for
arbitrators specifically rejects immunity for mediators.
Language: "All persons serving as arbitrators under this local
rule are deemed to be performing quasi-judicial functions
and are entitled to the immunities and protections that the
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law accords to persons serving in such capacity. Mediators
are not afforded this same protection."
Comments: This is the only provision of its kind that I could locate that specifically rejects immunity.
ILLINOIS
STATUTE: 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/4(B) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediating disputes involving
licensing of podiatrists.
Degree of Immunity: Limited to conduct not involving "willful or
wanton misconduct."
Language: "While serving upon any.., mediation committee...
considering such matters of peer review or any review committee sanctioned by the profession or sponsored by its association, a podiatric physician shall not be liable for civil
damages as a result of his or her acts, omissions or decisions
in connection with his or her duties on such committees or
boards, except in cases involving willful or wanton
misconduct."
Comment: This specialized program provides limited protection,
while the court-annexed programs from the state's supreme
court rule provide immunity "to the same extent as a judge."
COURT RULE: ILL. SUP. CT. R. 99(b)(1).
Category: Specialized supreme court rule for the establishment
of mediation programs by the judicial circuits.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a
judge."
Language: "(1) Each judicial circuit electing to establish a mediation program shall adopt rules for the conduct of the mediation proceedings. A person approved by the circuit to act as
a mediator under these rules shall have judicial immunity in
the same manner and to the same extent as a judge."
Comment: Outlines rules to be followed by local Illinois court
circuits which have established a mediation program, and
mandates that court-approved mediators have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a
judge.
LOCAL RULE: ILL. 17TH J. CIR. CT. ARBIT. R. 2.08 (III)(P).
Category: Specialized program for court-ordered mediation for
civil cases in Boone and Winnebago Counties.

Mediator Immunity

Degree of Immunity: Full. The rule invokes Supreme Court Rule
99(b)(1) that creates immunity to the same extent as a judge.
Language: "Mediators conducting mediation pursuant to these
rules shall have such immunity as may from time to time be
provided by law."

LOCAL RULE: ILL. 18-H J.

CIR. CT.

R. 15.18(I)(K).

Category: Specialized rule for court-ordered mediation for civil
cases in DuPage County.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a
judge."
Language: "A mediator, approved and certified by this Circuit
and acting pursuant to these rules, shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge,
under the authority conferred by Supreme Court Rule
99(b)(1) as amended, October 10, 2001."
Comment: The only mediators entitled to immunity under this
provision are those presiding over court-ordered mediation.
LOCAL RULE: ILL. 19TH J. CIR. R. 11.13(n).
Category: Specialized program for court-ordered mediation for
civil cases in Lake and McHenry Counties.
Degree of Immunity: Full, "to the same extent as a judge."
Language: "An approved mediator shall have judicial immunity
in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge."
INDIANA

STATUTE:

§ 4-21.5-3.5-4 (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of conflicts in administrative proceedings.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a
judge."
Language: "A mediator, co-mediator, or team mediator appointed and acting under this chapter [Chapter 3.5] has immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a
judge having jurisdiction in Indiana."
IND. CODE ANN.

COURT RULE: IND. ADR R. 1.5.
Category: General coverage for all civil and domestic litigation.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a
judge."
Language: "A registered or court approved mediator; arbitrator;
person acting as an advisor or conducting, directing, or as-
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sisting in a mini-trial; a presiding person conducting a summary jury trial and the members of its advisory jury; and a
private judge; shall each have immunity in the same manner
and to the same extent as a judge in the State of Indiana."
Comment: Rule 8.3 of the ADR Rules requires a written agreement to mediate that acknowledges immunity.

LOCAL RULE: U.S.

DIST. CT. S.D. IND. R. ADR § 1.3.
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
Degree of Immunity: Full.
Language: "To the extent permitted under applicable law, each
Mediator shall have immunity in the performance of his or
her duties under these Rules, in the same manner, and to the
same extent, as would a duly appointed Judge."

LOCAL RULE: U.S.

BANKR. CT. N.D. IND. R., Order 2001-02
(1.2).
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Indiana.
Degree of Immunity: Full.
Language: "All persons servings as neutrals in any of the Court's
ADR Programs are entitled to immunities and protections
that the law accords to said persons, to the greatest extent
possible while serving in such capacity."

IOWA

STATUTE:

IowA CODE ANN.

§ 13.16(1) (West 2003).

Category: Specialized program for farmer-lender mediation.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
done in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of others.
Language: "A member of the farm mediation staff, including a
mediator, employee, or agent of the service, or member of a
board for the service, is not liable for civil damages for a
statement or decision made in the process of mediation, unless the member acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or
in a manner exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of
human rights, safety, or property."
STATUTE: IowA CODE ANN. § 679.13 (West 2003).

Mediator Immunity

Category: Mediation of various minor disputes listed in
§ 679.5(1) and mediated by dispute resolution centers.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
done in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of others.
Language: "No mediator, employee or agent of a center, or
member of a center's board may be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process of
dispute resolution unless the mediator, employee, agent or
member acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose or in a
manner exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of human
rights, safety or property."

STATUTE:

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 679C.4 (West 2003).

Category: General mediation statute, but the immunity provision
does not cover mediations involving collective bargaining
agreements. See § 20.21.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
done in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or exhibiting willful or wanton disregard of others.
Language: "A mediator or a mediation program shall not be liable for civil damages for a statement, decision, or omission
made in the process of mediation unless the act or omission
by the mediator or mediation program is made in bad faith,
with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting willful or
wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property. This
section shall apply to mediation conducted before the
worker's compensation commissioner and mediation conducted pursuant to chapter 216."
Comment: Grants qualified immunity identical to that of § 679.13
to mediators or mediation programs involved in mediation,
including mediation conducted before the workers' compensation commissioner and mediations before the Civil Rights
Commission (see § 216).
KANSAS

STATUTE:

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 5-513 (West 2003).

Category: General statute for mediation of a broad array of conflicts. See § 5-501(b).
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to
cases where mediator acts with gross negligence, maliciousness, or in willful disregard of the rights of a party.
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Language: "No neutral person, staff member, or member of a
governing board of an approved program may be held liable
for civil damages for any statement or decision made in the
process of dispute resolution unless such person acts, or fails
to act, in a manner constituting gross negligence with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful disregard of
the rights, safety or property of any party to the process of
dispute resolution."
Comment: This provision applies to "registered and approved"
dispute resolution programs, individuals, and personnel.
§ 5-501(b). Application requirements for programs and individuals are provided in § 5-507.
KENTUCKY
COURT RULE: Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.815(10).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving attorneys. See 3.815 (1) & (2)(E).
Degree of Immunity: Full, based upon duty to hold mediator
harmless.
Language: "By agreeing to the procedures authorized herein, the
parties further agree to indemnify and hold harmless the
hearing officer, arbitrator, mediator, or presiding officer or
panel concerning any action arising out of the procedures set
forth by this rule and for any and all conduct of the hearing
officer, arbitrator, mediator or presiding officer or panel
presiding over the procedures herein."
Comment: Unique provision that requires parties to hold the mediator harmless, instead of just establishing immunity. May
not prevent suit, as immunity does, but ultimately should
have the same affect.
LOUISIANA
None
MAINE
STATUTE: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 18-B (3) (West 2004).
Category: General statewide court-annexed program.
Degree of Immunity: Full within scope of duties.

Language: "A person serving as an ADR provider under contract with the Judicial Department or as the Director of the
Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Service is immune
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from any civil liability, as are employees of governmental
entities, under the Maine Tort Claims Act, for acts performed within the scope of the provider's or the director's
duties."
Comment: The immunity provided by this section is different
than that found in tit. 20-A § 7207-C (below), where the immunity for mediators of special education disputes matches
that provided to state employees under the State Tort
Claims Act. See tit. 14 § 8104-B (4). However, it is the
same as the provision for mediation of disputes involving
recreational vehicle manufacturers and dealers, below.
tit. 10, § 1440(5) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving recreational vehicle manufacturers and dealers.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity extends to acts or omissions that are done in good faith, with a "clear and convincing" standard of proof necessary to overcome the
presumption of good faith.
Language: "A mediator or arbitrator is immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the
mediator's or arbitrator's performance of powers and duties
under this section. Every act or omission is presumed to be
a good faith act or omission. This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence."
Comment: The immunity provided by this section is different
than that found in tit. 20-A § 7207-C (below), where the immunity for mediators of special education disputes matches
that provided to state employees under the State Tort
Claims Act in tit. 14 § 8104-B (4). However, it is the same
as the general court-annexed program of tit. 4 § 18-B(3).

STATUTE:

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

STATUTE:

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 20-A, § 7207-C(3) (West

2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving special education.
Degree of Immunity: Full. Although the immunity matches that
extended to state employees under the Maine Tort Claims
Act (tit. 14 § 8104-B(4)), there is immunity for all discretionary functions.
Language: "The State shall train impartial mediators. For the
purposes of this section, while carrying out their official duties, mediators are considered state employees and are enti-
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tied to the immunity provided state employees under the
Maine Tort Claims Act."
Comment: The immunity granted in this provision differs from
tit. 10 § 1440(5), above.
MARYLAND
None
MASSACHUSETTS
None
MICHIGAN

STATUTE:

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1557a (2000).
Category: Specialized program for the creation of Community
Dispute Resolution Centers to provide mediation services as
an alternative to the judicial processes. See § 691.1553.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to mediator acts that are in bad faith, malicious, or that exhibit
wanton and willful disregard for the rights of the parties.
Language: "A mediator of a community dispute resolution
center shall not be held liable for civil damages for any act
or omission in the scope of his or her employment or function as a mediator, unless he or she acted in bad faith or with
malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and
willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
another."
Comment: "Community dispute resolution center" is not otherwise defined in the Act, but § 691.1553 states that the purpose of such program centers is "to provide conciliation,
mediation, or other forms and techniques of voluntary dispute resolution to persons as an alternative to the judicial
process."

MINNESOTA

STATUTE:

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 518.1751(5) (West 2003).

Category: Specialized program for resolution of parenting time
disputes. See § 518.1751(1).
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity if "acting under this section."
Language: "A parenting time expeditor is immune from civil liability for actions taken or not taken when acting under this
section."
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Comment: A parenting time expeditor is a neutral person authorized, under § 518.1751(lb)(c), to use mediation to resolve disputes involving parenting time.

STATUTE:

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 583.26(7)(a) (West 2003).

Category: Specialized program for the mandatory mediation of
farmer-lender disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "within the scope of the position as mediator."
Language: "A mediator is immune from civil liability for actions
within the scope of the position as mediator. A mediator
does not have a duty to advise a creditor or debtor about the
law or to encourage or assist a debtor or creditor in reserving or establishing legal rights. This subdivision is an addition to and not a limitation of immunity otherwise accorded
to a mediator under law."
Comment: Although the statute refers to other immunity provisions, Minnesota does not appear to grant mediators immunity in any other circumstances. See Schaffer v. Agribank,
1997 WL 40739 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
MISSISSIPPI
None
MISSOURI
None
MONTANA
COURT RULE: MoNT.R. APP. PROc. 54(d).
Category: Specialized program for the mandatory mediation of
selected appeals.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity.
Language: "Mediators shall be selected or appointed as provided
in this subsection and shall enjoy such judicial immunity as
the Montana Supreme Court would enjoy if performing the
same functions."
Comment: Application of Rule 54 is limited to appeals for workers compensation (54(a)(1)), domestic relations (54(a)(2)),
and money judgments (54(a)(3)). Domestic relations excluded from this provision include "actions for termination
of parental rights, paternity disputes, adoptions, and all juve-
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nile and contempt proceedings when the excluded matters
constitute the only issues on appeal." (54(a)(2)).
NEBRASKA

STATUTE:

§ 25-2915 (2003).
Category: Specialized program for a broad array of civil disputes
referred through dispute resolution centers.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
of willful or wanton misconduct.
Language: "No mediator, staff member, or member of a governing board of an approved center may be held liable for
civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless such person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct."
NEB. REV. STAT.

STATUTE:

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-168(2)(b) (2003).
Category: Specialized program for the mediation of worker's
compensation disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
of willful or wanton misconduct.
Language: "No staff member or mediator shall be held liable for
civil damages for any statement or decision made in the process of dispute resolution unless such person acted in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton misconduct."

NEVADA
None
NEW HAMPSHIRE

COURT RULE: N.H.

SUPER. CT. R. 170(E).
Category: General program for the mandatory mediation of actions in the superior court.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity, because mediators are "performing quasi-judicial functions."
Language: "The litigants and counsel must recognize that the
neutrals will not be acting as legal advisors or legal representatives. They must further recognize that, because the
neutrals are performing quasi-judicial functions and are performing under the auspices of the Court, each such neutral
has immunity from suit ...."
Comment: This section notes that neutrals are performing
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"quasi-judicial functions" but nevertheless grants full immunity as though the neutral acts in a full judicial capacity.
NEW JERSEY
STATUTE: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-12.6(a) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for the mediation of disputes
within the Parents' Education Program.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to program representatives' actions that are fraudulent, reckless,
willful, wanton, or grossly negligent.
Language: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, no person serving as a program representative in
the "Parents' Education Program" established pursuant to
section 3 of P.L. 1999, c. 111 (C.2A:34-12.3) shall be liable
for damages resulting from any exercise of judgment or discretion in connection with the person's duties unless the actions are fraudulent or evidence a reckless disregard for the
duties imposed by the position. Nothing in this section shall
be deemed to grant immunity to any program representative
causing damage by that person's willful, wanton or grossly
negligent act of commission or omission."
Comment: This section does not mention mediation or dispute
resolution as part of program representatives' duties. However, one of the purposes of the program is "to assist parents
in resolving issues which may arise during the divorce ...
process." § 2A:34-12.3(c).
NEW MEXICO
LOCAL RULE: N.M. 2D J. DIST. R. LR2-601(E).
Category: Specialized program contained in the local rules of the
Second Judicial District for court-annexed alternative dispute resolution.
Degree of Immunity: Full within the scope of the court's
appointment.
Language: "Attorneys and other persons appointed by the court
to serve as settlement facilitators, arbitrators, mediators or
in other such roles pursuant to the rules governing this district's court-annexed alterative dispute resolution programs,
are appointed to serve as arms of the court and as such are
immune from liability for conduct within the scope of their
appointment."
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Comment: This provision grants immunity only to court-appointed mediators assigned to "court-annexed alternative
dispute resolution programs."
NEW YORK
LOCAL RULE: N.Y. Sup. CT. COMM. Div. ADR R. 6 (New
York County).
Category: Specialized ADR program in the New York County
Supreme Court Commercial Division.
Degree of Immunity: Full, while serving in the capacity of a
Neutral.
Language: "Any person designated to serve as Neutral pursuant
to these Rules shall be immune from suit based upon any
actions engaged in or omissions made while serving in that
capacity."
Comment: Available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/comdiv/
ADRRules.htm.
LOCAL RULE: N.Y. Sup. CT. App. Div. CT. R., Part 1220, App.
A(5)(d).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of attorney-client
disputes.
Degree bf Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
or omissions that involve willful misconduct.
Language: "The mediator will not be liable for any act or omission while serving as an approved volunteer mediator except
for willful misconduct. Attorneys serving as volunteer
mediators in this program are entitled to the protections afforded to State-sponsored volunteers within the meaning of
subdivision (1) of section 17 of the Public Officers Law."
Comment: See generally N.Y. PUB. OFF. Law § 17 (McKinney
2003) regarding defense and indemnification of state officers
and employees. The statute provides immunity to volunteers serving in state-sponsored programs. Many of the New
York court mediators serve as volunteers and are presumed
to be covered by this law.
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT.S. & E.D.N.Y. R. § 83.11(g).
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the federal courts.
Degree of Immunity: Uncertain.

Language: "Mediators shall be immune from liability or suit with

Mediator Immunity

respect to their conduct as such to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law."
Comment: This provision appears to provide full immunity, but
other court rules above limit immunity of mediators. There
is no indication about which law, state or federal, to apply to
this question. Because the question of immunity is not clear,
this provision was not included in the specialized counts that
categorized provisions based upon whether they provided
full or limited immunity.
See also General Order M-143 of U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York Local Rules, which provides
for full immunity.
NORTH CAROLINA

STATUTE: N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 7A-38.1(j) (2003).

Category: General program for mandatory pretrial mediated
settlement conferences in superior court civil actions. § 7A38.1(a).
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity, but subject to administrative disciplinary actions.
Language: "Mediator [sic] and other neutrals acting pursuant
to this section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court
of Justice, except that mediators and other neutrals may be
disciplined in accordance with enforcement procedures
adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to G.S. 7A-38.2."
Comment: Mediators and other neutrals are granted civil immunity but are still subject to discipline under § 7A-38.2.

STATUTE: N.C.

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 7A-38.4A(h) (West 2004).

Category: General program for court-annexed mediation of
district court actions involving equitable distribution, alimony, or support.
Degree of Immunity: Full, but subject to administrative disciplinary actions.
Language: "Mediators and other neutrals acting under this
section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and
to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice, except that mediators and other neutrals may be disciplined in accordance with enforcement procedures adopted
by the Supreme Court under G.S. 7A-38.2."
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STATUTE: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-301.1 (b)(3) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes arising
under the motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers law.
Degree of Immunity: Full, to the same extent as a judge.
Language: "A mediator acting pursuant to this subdivision shall
have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same
extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice.

STATUTE: N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 150B-23.1(h) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for prehearing settlement conferences of administrative proceedings.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a
judge."
Language: "A mediator acting pursuant to this section shall have
judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice."
Comment: Some inconsistency is apparent because this section
neglects to subject mediators to administrative discipline as
in § 7A-38.1(j).

LOCAL RULE: N.C. R.

BURKE COUNTY

12.12.

Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes in
Burke County.
Degree of Immunity: Full, to the same extent as a judge.
Language: "Mediators and other neutrals acting pursuant to this
section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and
to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of
Justice.. .. "
Comments: Provision also refers to a discipline procedure for
mediator misconduct.

LOCAL RULE: N.C. ADR R.

DAVIDSON COUNTY 5(J).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes in Davidson County.
Degree of Immunity: Full, "to the same extent as a judge."
Language: "A Mediator/Arbitrator acting pursuant to these
Rules shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and
to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice, and as provided by N.C.G.S. 57A-38.1(J)."

LOCAL RULE: N.C. ADR R.

MECKLENBURG COUNTY FAM.

Div. 4(B)(10).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of equitable distriCT.
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bution and other family financial disputes in Mecklenburg
County.
Degree of Immunity: Full, "to the same extent as a judge."
Language: "A neutral acting pursuant to these Rules shall have
judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice."
Comment: Rule 5 of the same rules requires the parties to enter
into an agreement to mediate which provides immunity of
the mediator.
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. E.D.N.C. ADR R. 101.3 (k).
Category: Specialized federal program for mediation of disputes
in the Eastern District.
Degree of Immunity: Full, "to the same extent as a judge."
Language: "A mediator appointed by the court pursuant to these
local rules shall have judicial immunity in the same manner
and to the same extent as a judge."
NORTH DAKOTA
STATUTE: N.D. CENT. CODE § 6.09.10-04.1 (2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of farmer-lender
disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity while "attempting to reach a
settlement."
Language: "The board, commissioner, administrator, staff, negotiators, and mediators are not subject to any liability arising
from any actions undertaken regarding a farmer, creditor, or
other person in attempting to reach a settlement."
Comment: This section was amended in 1989 to extend mediator
immunity to "other person[s]" in addition to farmers and
creditors. Laws 1989, ch. 109, § 5 (1989).
OHIO
The following local court rules do not contain immunity provisions, but are included as a illustrationof dealing with risk of
mediator misconduct. Each rule requires mediators to maintain liability insurance as one of the minimum qualifications
to take part in the court-annexed program.
LOCAL RULE: OHIO CUYAHOGA COUNTY C.P. DOM. REL. R.
32(E)(4).
Category: Program in Cuyahoga County for mediation of domestic relations disputes.
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Degree of Immunity: None. Mediators must procure insurance
to cover civil liability.
Language: "Mediators shall have the following minimum qualifications: ....(4) Maintenance of appropriate liability insur-

ance specifically covering the activities of the individual as a
mediator."
LOCAL RULE: OHIO FRANKLIN COUNTY C.P. DOM. REL. R.
22(5).
Category: Program in Franklin County for mediation of domestic
relations disputes.
Degree of Immunity: None. Mediators must procure insurance
to cover civil liability.
Language: "... [A] mediator should possess the following qualifications: ....(5) Maintenance of appropriate liability insur-

ance specifically covering the activities of the individual as a
mediator."
LOCAL RULE: Ohio Ct. Order 22, LUCAS DOM. REL. R
18.04(D).
Category: Program in Lucas County for mediation of domestic
relations disputes.
Degree of Immunity: None. Mediators must procure insurance
to cover civil liability.
Language: "Any mediator employed by the court, or with whom
the Court makes referrals, shall have the following minimum
qualifications: ....(D) Maintenance of appropriate liability

insurance specifically covering the activities of the individual
as a mediator."
OKLAHOMA
STATUTE: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(E) (West 2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes of
"4small social or economic magnitude" (tit. 12 § 1801) within
guidelines established by the Administrative Director of the
Courts. See tit. 12 §§ 1803(A) & (D)(2).
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to actions resulting from gross negligence, malicious purpose, or
willful disregard of the rights of a party.
Language: "No mediator, employee, or agent of a mediator shall
be held liable for civil damages for any statement or decision
made in the process of mediating or settling a dispute unless
the action of such person was a result of gross negligence
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with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of any party to the
mediation."

STATUTE:

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(m) (West

2003) (as amended by 2004 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 143
(West)).
Category: Specialized program for victim/offender reconciliation.
Degree of Immunity: Full.
Language: "Volunteer mediators and employees of a victim/offender reconciliation program shall be immune from
liability ......
OREGON

STATUTE: OR.

REV. STAT.

§ 36.210(1) (2003).

Category: General program. See § 36.100-36.238.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
or omissions that are "done in bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard" of
another.
Language: "Mediators, mediation programs and dispute resolution programs providing services under ORS 36.100 to
36.238 and mediators, mediation programs and other community programs providing dispute resolution services that
comply with the standards established under ORS 36.175,
107.755 or 107.775 are not civilly liable for any act or omission done or made while engaged in efforts to assist or facilitate a mediation or in providing other dispute resolution
services, unless the act or omission was made or done in bad
faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety or property of
another."
Comment: Limited immunity is consistently reflected in other
statutes. See below. For purposes of the tallying of statutes,
§ 36.210(1)-(2) were considered as one statute.

STATUTE:

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 36.210(2) (2003).

Category: Companion statute to § 36.210(1), above. This statute
covers disclosure of confidential communications.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
or omissions that are done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or exhibiting a willful or wanton disregard of another.
Language: "Mediators, mediation programs and dispute resolu-
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tion programs are not civilly liable for the disclosure of a
confidential mediation communication unless the disclosure
was made in bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner
exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety or
property of another."
Comment: This provision applies specifically to mediator actions
involving the disclosure of confidential communications.
For purposes of the tallying of statutes, § 36.210(1)-(2) were
considered as one statute.
STATUTE: OR. REV. STAT. § 36.264 (2003).
Category: General program.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
or omissions that are done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or exhibiting a willful or wanton disregard of another.
Language: "Mediators and mediation services shall be immune
from civil liability for, or resulting from, any act or omission
done or made while engaged in efforts to assist or facilitate a
mediation, unless the act or omission was made or done in
bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a
willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety or property of
another."
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. D. OR. Civ. R. § 16.4(e)(2)(C).
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.
Degree of Immunity: Full for court-referred mediation.
Language: "During the conduct of court directed mediation,
mediators act as officers of the court and have judicial
immunity."
PENNSYLVANIA
STATUTE: 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 818.11(c) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving vehicle manufacturers, distributors, and dealers.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity extends to acts or omissions that are done in in good faith, with a "clear and convincing" standard of proof necessary to overcome the
presumption of good faith.
Language: "A mediator or arbitrator is immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the
mediator's or arbitrator's performance of his powers and duties under this section. Every act or omission of a mediator
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or arbitrator is presumed to be a good faith act or omission.
This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence."
RHODE ISLAND
None
SOUTH CAROLINA

LOCAL RULE: S.C.

CIR. CT.

ADR R. 8(i).

Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
Charleston, Florence, Horry, Lexington, and Richland
Counties.
Degree of Immunity: Full, for mediations conducted under the
rules.
Language: "The mediator shall not be liable to any person for
any act or omission in connection with any mediation conducted under these rules."

LOCAL RULE: S.C.

FAM. CT. MEDIATION

R. 7(i).

Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
family court in Florence and Richland Counties.
Degree of Immunity: Full, for mediations conducted under the
rules.
Language: "The mediator shall not be liable to any person for
any act or omission in connection with any mediation conducted under these rules."
Comment: Same immunity language as in prior local rule.
LOCAL RULE: U.S. DIST. CT. D.S.C. Civ. R. § 16.10(J).
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation in
the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina.
Degree of Immunity: Full.
Language: "The mediator shall not be liable to any person for
any act or omission in connection with any mediation conducted under these Local Civil Rules."
SOUTH DAKOTA
CODIFIED LAWS § 54-13-20 (Michie 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mandatory mediation of
farmer-lender disputes. See § 54-13-10.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only covers actions

STATUTE: S.D.
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done "in good faith, in a reasonable and prudent manner,"
and within the scope of official functions.
Language: "Any person serving as a mediator or ag finance
counselor pursuant to this chapter is immune from civil liability in any action brought in any court in this state on the
basis of any act or omission resulting in damage or injury if
the individual was acting in good faith, in a reasonable and
prudent manner, and within the scope of such individual's
official functions and duties as a mediator or ag finance
counselor pursuant to this chapter."
TENNESSEE
STATUTE: TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-105(b) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for victim-offender mediation
centers.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to willful or wanton misconduct by employees and volunteers of
the mediation centers.
Language: "Employees and volunteers of a center are immune
from suit in any civil action based on any proceedings or
other official acts performed in their capacity as employees
or volunteers, except in cases of willful or wanton
misconduct."
Comment: Members of the board of directors of a mediation
center are also granted limited immunity, but only to the extent of "official acts performed in good faith as members of
the board." §16-20-105(a).
STATUTE: TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-138(b) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving the health-related boards in the state department of
health.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only to a "deliberative
privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the
boards."
Language: "The members of the screening panels, mediators and
arbitrators have a deliberative privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the boards. .. ."
Comment: This provision applies to screening panels for the
board of examiners in psychology, osteopathic examination,
veterinary medical examiners, occupational and physical
therapy examiners, and the Tennessee emergency medical
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services board. § 63-1-138(a). Members of the screening
panels are chosen from members of the relevant boards.
§ 63-1-138(d).
STATUTE: TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-4-115(g) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving the licensure of chiropractors.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only to a "deliberate
privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the
board."
Language: "The members of the screening panels, mediators and
arbitrators have a deliberative privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the board ......
Comment: Board members are immune from civil liability for actions that are "in good faith and without malice." § 63-4118.

STATUTE:

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 63-6-214 (i)(3) (2004).

Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving licensing of doctors and surgeons.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only to a "deliberate
privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the
board."
Language: "The members of the screening panels, mediators and
arbitrators have a deliberative privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the board. ..."

STATUTE:

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 63-7-115 (c)(3) (2004).

Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving the licensing of nurses.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only to a "deliberative
privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the
board."
Language: "The members of the screening panels, mediators and
arbitrators have a deliberative privilege and the same immunity as provided by law for the board...."

COURT RULE:

TENN. Sup. CT. R. 31 § 12.
Category: General program for court-annexed mediation, with
limited exceptions. See § 2(d).
Degree of Immunity: Full judicial immunity.
Language: "Activity of Rule 31 Neutrals in the course of Rule 31
ADR proceedings shall be deemed the performance of a ju-
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dicial function and for such acts Rule 31 Neutrals shall be
entitled to judicial immunity."
Comment: A "Neutral" is any person who acts as a neutral in a
mediation. See § 2(1). A conflict exists among the immunity
standards in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-20-105(b), 6 3-4-115(g),
and this supreme court rule. One statute protects all activities that are in good faith and without malice, the other extends to all conduct that is not willful or wanton, while the
Supreme Court Rule provides mediators with judicial
immunity.
TEXAS
STATUTE: TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.055(a)
(Vernon 2004).
Category: General program for court-annexed mediation and
other forms of voluntary processes.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Provision only protects volunteers
who do "not act with wanton or wilful disregard of the
rights, safety, or property of another."
Language: "A person appointed to facilitate an alternative dispute resolution procedure under this subchapter or under
Chapter 152 relating to an alternative dispute resolution system established by counties, or appointed by the parties
whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, who is a volunteer and who does not act with wanton and wilful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of
another, is immune from civil liability for any act or omission within the course and scope of his or her duties or functions as an impartial third party. For purposes of this
section, a volunteer impartial third party is a person who
does not receive compensation in excess of reimbursement
for expenses incurred or a stipend intended as reimbursement for expenses incurred."
UTAH
STATUTE: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-6(4) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for appellate mediation.
Degree of Immunity: Full.

Language: "When acting as mediators, the Chief Appellate Mediator and other professional staff of the Appellate Media-
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tion Office shall be immune from liability pursuant to Title
63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act."

COURT RULE:

UTAH

R. J.

ADMIN.

4-510(13).

Category: General program for court-annexed mediation in the
District Courts.
Degree of Immunity: Full, but the trial judge can sanction the
mediator for conduct which raises "a substantial question as
to the impartiality of the ADR provider."
Language: "An ADR provider acting as a mediator or arbitrator
in cases under the ADR program shall be immune from liability to the same extent as judges of this state, except for
such sanctions the judge having jurisdiction of the case may
impose for a violation of URCADR Rule 104 which raises a
substantial question as to the impartiality of the ADR provider and the conduct of the ADR proceeding involved."
VERMONT
None
VIRGINIA
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.9 (Michie 2004).
Category: General program for court-annexed mediation for
mediators certified by the Judicial Council.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
or omissions done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or exhibiting willful, wanton disregard of others.
Language: "With respect to liability, when mediation is provided
by a mediator who is certified pursuant to guidelines
promulgated by the Judicial Council of Virginia, then the
mediator, mediation program for which the certified mediator is providing services, and a mediator co-mediating with a
certified mediator shall be immune from civil liability for, or
resulting from, any act or omission done or made while engaged in efforts to assist or conduct a mediation, unless the
act or omission was made or done in bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety or property of another. This
language is not intended to abrogate any other immunity
that may be applicable to a mediator."
Comment: Like § 8.01-581.23 (below), this provision notes that it
is "not intended to abrogate any other immunity that may be

STATUTE:
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applicable to a mediator," but no other provisions or common law exist on this issue.
STATUTE: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.23 (Michie 2003).
Category: General program for mediation for mediators certified
by the Judicial Council or who serve through the statewide
mediation program established under § 2.2-1001(2).
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to acts
or omissions done in bad faith, with malicious intent, or exhibiting willful, wanton disregard of others.
Language: "When a mediation is provided by a mediator who is
certified pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Judicial
Council of Virginia, or who is trained and serves as a mediator through the statewide mediation program established
pursuant to § 2.2-1001(2), then that mediator, mediation
programs for which that mediator is providing services, and
a mediator co-mediating with that mediator shall be immune
from civil liability for, or resulting from, any act or omission
done or made while engaged in efforts to assist or conduct a
mediation, unless the act or omission was made or done in
bad faith, with malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a
willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety or property of
another. This language is not intended to abrogate any
other immunity that may be applicable to a mediator."
Comment: Like § 8.01-576.9, above, this provision notes that it is
"not intended to abrogate any other immunity that may be
applicable to a mediator," but no other provisions or common law exist on this issue.
WASHINGTON
STATUTE: WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.100(2) (2004).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes by authorized dispute resolution centers.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity applies to employees
and volunteers of dispute resolution centers and does not
extend to acts of willful or wanton misconduct.
Language: "Employees and volunteers of a dispute resolution
center are immune from suit in any civil action based on any
proceedings or other official acts performed in their capacity
as employees or volunteers, except in cases of wilful or wanton misconduct."
Comment: Statute also grants qualified immunity to members of

Mediator Immunity

the board of directors of a dispute resolution center
(§ 7.75.100(1)). Statute also grants immunity to the dispute
resolution center, as an entity, except in cases of willful or
wanton misconduct by its employees or volunteers or in
cases of official acts performed in bad faith by members of
its board. (§ 7.75.100(3)). A conflict exists between the immunity standards established by this statute and the admission to practice rule below. The statute provides immunity
for all acts except those of a willful or wanton nature, while
the rule only provides protection for acts in good faith.

COURT RULE: WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 16(e)(1).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving attorneys and their clients, other attorneys, and other
professionals.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity does not extend to actions done in bad faith.
Language: "No cause of action shall accrue in favor of any person, arising from any action or proceeding pursuant to these
rules, against the Bar Association, or its officers or agents
(including but not limited to its staff, members of the Board
of Governors, mediators, or any other individual acting
under authority of these rules) provided only that the Bar
Association, officer or agent shall have acted in good faith."
Comment: The mediation program is maintained and administered by the Washington State Bar Association. R. 16(b). A
conflict exists between the immunity standards established
by this admission to practice rule and the statute (above).
The statute provides immunity for all acts except those of a
willful or wanton nature, while the rule only protection for
good-faith acts.
WEST VIRGINIA
COURT RULE: W. VA. R. PRAC. & PROC. FAM. CT. MED. 45.
Category: Specialized program for court-annexed mediation of
family court matters.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a family court judge."
Language: "Mediators and premediation screeners shall have immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a family court judge."
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COURT RULE: U.S.

DIsT. CT. N.D. W. VA. R. Civ. PROC.
16.06(f).
Category: General federal program for mediation of civil cases in
the Northern District of West Virginia.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a judicial officer."
Language: "A person acting as a mediator under these rules shall
have immunity in the same manner and to the same extent
as a judicial officer."

COURT RULE: W.

VA. TR. CT. R. 25.13.
Category: General program for mediation of civil cases in the circuit courts.
Degree of Immunity: Full immunity "to the same extent as a circuit judge."
Language: "A person acting as a mediator under these rules shall
have immunity in the same manner and to the same extent
as a circuit judge."
Comment: This rule covers mediation of civil cases in "circuit
courts, including appeals and administrative appeals, but excluding "domestic relation matters." See R. 25.01.

WISCONSIN
STATUTE: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 93.50(2)(c) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of farmer-lender
disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Full within the scope of mediators' powers
and duties.
Language: "Mediators and arbitrators are immune from civil liability for any act or omission within the scope of their performance of their powers and duties under this section."
Comment: A conflict exists in the immunity provisions of the
state statutes. This farmer-lender statute provides for full
immunity, but the motor vehicle statute (below) only provides a presumption of good faith.

STATUTE: Wis.

§ 218.0138 (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes between motor vehicle dealers, salespersons, and sales finance
companies.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity extends to acts or omissions that are done in good faith, with a "clear and convincSTAT. ANN.
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ing" standard of proof necessary to overcome the
presumption of good faith.
Language: "A mediator or arbitrator is immune from civil liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope of the
mediator's or arbitrator's performance of his or her powers
Every act or omission of a
and duties under s. 218.0136 ....
mediator or arbitrator is presumed to be a good faith act or
omission. This presumption may be overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence."
Comment: A conflict exists in the immunity provisions of the
state statutes. This motor vehicle statute only provides a
presumption of good faith, while the farmer-lender statute
(above) provides for full immunity.
STATUTE: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.465(6) (West 2003).
Category: Specialized program for mediation of disputes involving health care issues.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity extends to acts or omissions that are done in good faith, with a "clear and convincing" standard of proof necessary to overcome the
presumption of good faith.
Language: "(a) A mediator is immune from civil liability for any
good faith act or omission within the scope of the mediator's
performance of his or her powers and duties under this subchapter. (b) It is presumed that every act or omission under
par. (a) is a good faith act or omission. This presumption
may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence."
WYOMING

STATUTE: Wyo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 1-43-104 (Michie 2003).

Category: General civil procedure rule for mediation.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only for acts done in
good faith.
Language: "Mediators are immune from civil liability for any
good faith act or omission within the scope of the performance of their power and duties."

STATUTE: Wyo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 11-41-105(d) (Michie 2003).

Category: Specialized program for mediation of farmer-lender
disputes.
Degree of Immunity: Limited. Immunity only for acts done in
good faith.
Language: "Mediators, and University of Wyoming financial
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analysts and extension personnel to the extent they participate in mediations under this chapter, are immune from civil
liability for any good faith act or omission within the scope
of the performance of their powers and duties under this
chapter."

